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This Article offers a fresh perspective on the pleading standard of plausi-
bility. The consensus regarding plausibility is that it requires a judge to
determine the probability of the plaintiff’s allegations. This perspective has
led to much of the criticism of the plausibility standard. In reality, plausi-
bility requires a judge to perform an analytically distinct inquiry, which I
term a confidence analysis. Recognizing this fact does not immunize plau-
sibility from all of the criticism it has received. It does, however, clarify the
analysis required under the standard, which should alleviate many of the
concerns associated with plausibility.
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THE Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly1 is notonly one of the most cited Supreme Court cases ever decided,2 it isalso one of the most misunderstood. The conventional wisdom re-
garding the “plausibility” standard introduced in Twombly is that this
analysis dramatically alters federal pre-trial procedure and fundamentally
changes the role and power of a federal judge at the pleadings stage of
litigation.3 According to this view, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now compels a judge to ascertain, for every civil case in federal
court, whether the factual allegations of a complaint are sufficiently likely
so as to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.4
In a previous article,5 I dispelled one aspect of the conventional wis-
dom regarding Twombly: The notion that Twombly’s plausibility analysis
must be applied to every federal complaint is wrong.6 In reality,
Twombly’s plausibility standard applies only to complaints that have
failed the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8.7 This Article contin-
ues with the theme of my previous article, which is that Twombly has
been misunderstood. Whereas my previous article addressed the question
of when a plausibility analysis is necessary, this Article considers what
type of analysis is expected under the plausibility standard.
The widely held view on this question is that the plausibility standard
requires a judge to consider the likelihood of the facts asserted by the
plaintiff.8 This perspective has been the impetus for some of the wide-
1. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295, 1357
(2010) (listing Twombly, as of March 17, 2010, as the seventh-most cited case of all time by
federal courts and tribunals).
3. See Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal,
Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 858, 868 (2012)
(explaining that Twombly “modified” the approach for determining whether a plaintiff has
stated a claim under Rule 8); Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 97, 98 (2011) (describing how Twombly “sent shockwaves throughout the federal civil
justice system”); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Ex-
cess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 629 (2009)
(explaining how Twombly enlarges “the power of the district judge to enter judgment on
the pleadings”).
4. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly: An Update After Matrixx, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 40 (2012) (“Some feared that the plausibility test would license
judges to evaluate the believability of any (or all) allegations in a complaint.”).
5. See generally Luke Meier, Why Twombly is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and
Iqbal Will be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709 (2012).
6. See id. at 711.
7. See id. (“[O]nly when the complaint has not been drafted with sufficient factual
specificity does the plausibility analysis become necessary.”).
8. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 3, at 859 (stating that the plausibility standard “re-
quires a district court to refer to objective information, albeit extraneous to the complaint,
to inform itself of the ‘truth’ of the factual picture painted by the plaintiff in the com-
plaint”); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility of Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435,
456–57 (2011) (“The Court’s use of the term ‘possibility,’ however, belies the assertion that
plausibility is not a probability analysis because possibility is an expression of
probability.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading And Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismis-
sal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 65, 83–84 (concluding that the plausibility test requires a probability
2015] Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s Plausibility Standard 333
spread scholarly backlash against the plausibility standard: how can a
judge, based only on the allegations in a complaint, engage in an analysis
of the likelihood of the facts in the plaintiff’s complaint?9 Moreover, how
is this procedure consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s protection of
a right to a jury trial in civil proceedings in federal courts?10
To appreciate why the conventional wisdom regarding the type of anal-
ysis required by the plausibility standard is wrong, and also to understand
why some of the attacks against plausibility are misguided, it is necessary
to distinguish between the concepts of probability and confidence.11
Stated simply, the concept of probability requires an estimate as to the
likelihood of a given fact being true from a particular set of information;
the confidence inquiry, on the other hand, asks how sure one can be in
any probability estimate derived from incomplete information.12 Whereas
a probability analysis requires a determination regarding what actually
happened, a confidence analysis requires a conclusion as to whether there
is a sufficient amount of information such that any probability estimate
will be useful to the task at hand.13 As I have explained in a series of
articles, distinguishing between these two concepts resolves a variety of
procedural questions that have plagued federal courts and academic com-
mentators for decades.14 Twombly’s plausibility standard is simply the
analysis); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2010) (stating that the plausibility analy-
sis depends “on the relative likelihood that legally actionable conduct occurred versus a
hypothesized innocent explanation”); Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blur-
ring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(A)(2) Plausibility Plead-
ing Standard Converges With the Heightened Fraud Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(B)
and the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 26 (2010) (describing Twombly’s plausibility standard as
a “tacit” probability requirement).
9. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Lat-
est Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 419, 489–90 (2010) (“Assessing which set of facts is more likely to be true is
not, however, a proper function of a court at the motion to dismiss stage.”); Allan R. Stein,
Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REV. 277, 284 (2009) (“To allow a judge to make those deter-
minations based on his own sense of history and human behavior without the benefit of an
adversarial presentation of the facts is the precise definition of prejudice: he is pre-judging,
without regard to the evidence.”).
10. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal “is uncon-
stitutional when measured against the traditional . . . interpretation of the Seventh Amend-
ment”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 38 (2010) (“[T]he Iqbal/
Twombly standard is unconstitutional.”).
11. See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary
Judgment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (2014).
12. See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard, 84
MISS. L. J. 747, 749–50 (2015).
13. See Meier, supra note 11, at 1–2.
14. See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and Matsushita: The Misunderstood
Summary Judgment Revolution 23 J.L. & POL’Y 69, 80 (2014) (explaining that the modern
view of summary judgment, inspired in part by Matsushita, should be reexamined because
Matsushita was decided under a confidence analysis rather than a probability analysis);
Meier, supra note 11, at 1–3 (arguing that the contemporary debate regarding the constitu-
tionality of summary judgment is misguided because it fails to appreciate the difference
between probability and confidence).
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most recent example of the confusion that can arise when these two prin-
ciples are not clearly distinguished and delineated.
Although the conventional wisdom is that Twombly’s plausibility anal-
ysis involves a probability analysis, the better interpretation of plausibil-
ity is as a confidence analysis. According to the Court in Twombly, the
plausibility standard “requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made”15 but “does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage.”16 As this lan-
guage suggests, the critical issue in Twombly was not that the Court
doubted the facts pleaded by the plaintiff. Instead, the Court was con-
cerned that any conclusion from the scant facts asserted by the plaintiff
would necessarily involve an impermissible amount of guess-work.17
Compelling reasons support the confidence interpretation of plausibil-
ity.18 For one, interpreting plausibility to mean confidence avoids the
spirited Seventh Amendment objections that have been asserted against
Twombly, most notably by Professor Suja Thomas.19 These Seventh
Amendment objections all presuppose that the plausibility analysis re-
quires a judge to engage in a probability analysis.20 Under a confidence
analysis, however, a judge does not weigh in on the likely existence of the
material facts to the litigation.21 Rather, under a confidence analysis, a
judge makes a legal and policy determination about whether certain facts
constitute a sufficient body of evidence from which to infer other facts.22
The Seventh Amendment does not preclude a judge from engaging in this
confidence inquiry, even at the pleadings stage; English common law
courts regularly engaged in this analysis at the time the Seventh Amend-
ment was adopted in 1791.23
Moreover, understanding plausibility to require a confidence inquiry
aligns Twombly with the preeminent summary judgment case of Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.24 Both the Matsushita
and Twombly cases involved similar antitrust claims based on the defend-
ants’ purported (and illegal) business agreements, and both cases resulted
15. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 556–57.
18. See Suja Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1851, 1853 (2008); Meier, supra note 11, at 71.
19. See Thomas, supra note 18, at 1853; Thomas, supra note 10, at 38; Klein, supra note
10, at 262 (all arguing that Twombly requires a court to engage in an unconstitutional
analysis).
20. See Thomas, supra note 18, at 1852 (arguing that the plausibility standard elimi-
nates the requirement that judges “take the alleged facts as true”); Klein, supra note 10, at
273 (implying that a probability analysis is required under the plausibility standard by stat-
ing that plausibility means “more than ‘possibility’ but something less than probability”).
21. See Meier, supra note 11, at 3–4.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 70. (discussing the constitutionality of a judge dismissing a case, before a
jury verdict, based on a confidence analysis).
24. See generally Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). See Meier, supra note 11, at 80.
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in a pre-jury judgment for the defendants.25 Because Matsushita was de-
cided according to a confidence inquiry,26 it makes sense that the plausi-
bility analysis in Twombly would involve the same inquiry.
The confidence principle can thus explain the relationship between the
cases of Matsushita and Twombly.27 More importantly, however, the con-
fidence principle also clarifies the broader relationship between summary
judgment and the pleading standard of plausibility.28 Commentators have
noted the relationship between plausibility and summary judgment,29 but
a complete understanding of this connection has eluded commentators
because the confidence principle has gone unidentified.
By understanding Twombly as a case in which plausibility was trig-
gered by the lack of factual specificity in the complaint, and by recogniz-
ing that plausibility requires a judge to employ a confidence analysis, a
clearer understanding emerges as to what transpired in Twombly. At the
end of the day, plausibility might simply require a judge to answer the
following question: if the plaintiff is able to assemble evidence of the real
world events that are described (with sufficient factual specificity) in the
complaint, would the plaintiff be entitled to proceed past the summary
judgment stage to a jury trial?30 If the answer to this question is “no,”
Twombly’s holding can be understood as determining that there is no
reason to delay this outcome.31 Properly understood, the logic and virtue
of the plausibility analysis cannot be ignored, even if one ultimately dis-
agrees with the merits of this procedural approach.32
25. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576–82; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–53 (both dismissing,
before trial, antitrust claims alleging illegal conspiracy).
26. See Meier, supra note 14, at 139 (explaining that Matsushita was decided accorded
to an confidence theory).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 18, at 1857 (“In Twombly and Tellabs, the Court
established standards for dismissal at the motion to dismiss stage that are similar to the
standard for summary judgment.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 431, 486 (2008) (“By requiring plaintiffs to offer factual allegations that report the
factual basis for their assertions of liability and to do so in a way that makes liability plausi-
ble, the Twombly Court effectively has moved the summary judgment evaluation up to the
pleading stage.”); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 81 (2007)
(“[Twombly] should be framed as a mini-summary judgment case, conducted at the close
of pleadings, and not as a pointless verbal disquisition on the contested meanings of ‘plau-
sible’ and ‘conceivable.’”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, De-
stabilizing Systems 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 849 (2010), at 833–34 n.47 (“[T]he Twombly-
Iqbal Courts seem to have collapsed the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 standards of convinc-
ingness into one.”).
30. See Meier, supra note 11, at 17. This confidence analysis could be framed slightly
differently; these variations are explored later in this article. See infra notes 116–19.
31. See Meier, supra note 11, at 18.
32. To be sure, there are legitimate policy objections to this procedural approach, as it
greatly undermines the importance of the discovery process. Commentators have pursued
this objection with vigor. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“Scholarly reaction to Twombly has been largely critical,
with most complaining that the Court imposed a heightened specificity standard of plead-
ing and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence to plead these specifics prior to discovery.”);
see also Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
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The organization of this Article is as follows: Part I establishes a neces-
sary framework for the remainder of this Article by briefly (1) discussing
direct and circumstantial evidence and (2) delineating a probability analy-
sis from a confidence analysis. Part II involves a slight detour to a discus-
sion of the heightened pleading standard adopted by Congress in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). A discussion of the
PSLRA pleading standard is important to understanding Twombly’s
plausibility standard. Both standards require a judge to make a determi-
nation about the relationship between (1) the facts pleaded by a plaintiff
in her complaint and (2) the material facts necessary for a recovery.33 The
PSLRA requires a probability analysis of this relationship,34 while
Twombly’s plausibility standard requires a confidence analysis of this re-
lationship. Identifying the PSLRA as a probability pleading standard fa-
cilitates the recognition that Twombly’s plausibility standard involves a
different type of analysis. Part III demonstrates that the best interpreta-
tion of Twombly’s plausibility standard is as a confidence, rather than a
probability, analysis. Part IV concludes by linking the conclusion reached
in this Article to that reached in my previous article regarding Twombly.
What emerges is a logical procedural approach that is immune to much of
the criticism that has been erroneously asserted against it.
I. FOUNDATION
In this section I will briefly discuss some introductory material, all of
which I have more fully examined in other scholarship. A quick summary
should provide the necessary foundation for the themes explored in the
remainder of this Article. Those interested in a more thorough discussion
of the issues identified in this section should consult my prior work.35
A. DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Recognizing the distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence is critical to the issues discussed herein. Direct evidence is evi-
dence that, if believed by the fact-finder, directly proves a material fact to
the litigation.36 Thus, if the dispositive question in a dispute is whether
the southbound traffic light was green, testimony from an eyewitness that
the light was green would constitute direct evidence of that material
fact.37 If the witness is believed, the material fact has been resolved.
REV. 43, 44–45 (2010) (suggesting that presuit discovery may resolve the “catch-22” situa-
tion created by Twombly). My objective in this Article is not to take a position on these
normative questions. Rather, the focus herein is descriptive.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
34. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
35. See Meier, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing the difference between direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence); id. at 17–18 (explaining a probability analysis and a confidence
analysis).
36. See Meier, supra note 12, at 753–54.
37. See id.
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Direct evidence should be contrasted with circumstantial evidence.38
Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a fact from which the fact-finder
might infer the existence of a material fact;39 we can refer to these as the
“basic fact” and the “material fact.”40 Circumstantial evidence, then, re-
quires an additional conclusion by the jury. First, the jury must believe
the proponent’s evidence that the basic fact exists. This process replicates
the process involved with direct evidence. In addition, however, circum-
stantial evidence requires the jury to take the additional step of inferring
the material fact from the basic fact. Thus, to prove that the southbound
traffic light was green, a lawyer might introduce the testimony of an eye-
witness who can testify that the eastbound traffic light was red. This re-
quires, first, a determination that the witness is accurate with regard to
his testimony regarding the eastbound traffic light. Second, a determina-
tion must be made regarding whether a southbound green light can be
inferred from the existence of an eastbound red traffic light. This infer-
ence from basic fact (eastbound red light) to material fact (southbound
green light) is the additional inference required from circumstantial, as
opposed to direct, evidence.41
Of course, at the pleadings stage, neither party will have introduced
any evidence into the case; at this stage of the litigation, the position of
the parties is based on what is written in their respective pleadings.42 In
this sense, it is somewhat misleading to use the terms direct and circum-
stantial evidence in discussing how a case should be treated at this early
pleadings stage. Nevertheless, the difference between direct and circum-
stantial evidence is informative in considering the pleading requirement
of plausibility because a party will draft her complaint differently depend-
ing on the type of evidence she has at the outset of the case.43 A party
with direct evidence of a material fact will be able to draft the complaint
with a certain level of factual specificity, providing the “who, what, and
whens” of that material fact.44 On the other hand, a party without direct
evidence of a material fact will describe why she believes that the mate-
rial fact exists, and will thus plead circumstantial evidence in the com-





42. See Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and
Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 28 n.137 (2010).
43. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1263 (2013)
(“Put another way, what may appear to be courts’ and commentators’ fixation with pre-
cisely what is stated in a complaint, is in an important respect, an indirect way of address-
ing what evidence needs to be present [at the outset of the suit].”).
44. Allen & Guy, supra note 42, at 41.
45. See id. Professor Kaplow has recently made the same general observation, al-
though he fails to appreciate that when an event is described with factual specificity in a
complaint an implicit assumption can be made that the plaintiff has direct evidence regard-
ing that event:
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informs the judge as to what type of evidence—direct or circumstantial—
the plaintiff has at the outset of the case.
The relationship between direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, and
the style of a complaint is apparent in the now-familiar facts of
Twombly.46 To recover in Twombly, the plaintiffs needed to show that
the defendants had entered into an agreement not to compete with each
other.47 The plaintiffs were not “sure,” however, that the defendants had
actually entered into such an agreement; the plaintiffs had no direct wit-
ness to this purported agreement.48 Obviously, though, the plaintiffs
needed to allege an agreement for their complaint to state a cause of
action.49 The plaintiffs could have made up facts to satisfy the factual
specificity requirements of Rule 8, but in doing so would have run afoul
of the prohibitions in Rule 11.50 Thus, the plaintiffs simply alleged the
existence of the agreement without any factual specificity as to the details
(who, what, when, etc.) of that agreement.51 The plaintiffs, however, intu-
itively understood that this generic assertion was not sufficient, and thus
proceeded to explain why they felt justified in alleging the occurrence of
the agreement. The plaintiffs thus alleged (with specific detail) the paral-
lel business activities of the defendants, on the premise that this parallel
Insistence on a statement of facts (notably, regarding allegations in a com-
plaint) does not in itself constitute a demand for evidence.
This conclusion, however, is substantially misleading—that is, as long as
allegations based on pure fantasy are impermissible. Proffering a fact entails
holding some basis for acceptance of the fact as true, which in turn requires
possessing some evidence. Knowledge presupposes some evidentiary basis,
information is tantamount to evidence, and belief in the truth of a fact pre-
supposes evidence. As a consequence, although insistence on particular facts
is not per se a demand for evidence, for all practical purposes it requires
evidence.
Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1263.
46. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–51 (2007).
47. Id. at 556 (explaining the agreement requirement).
48. Id. at 561–62.
49. Or, at least, the plaintiffs in Twombly believed that it was necessary to make this
allegation to state a claim under Rule 8. Whether a plaintiff must allege the facts that
constitute a “cause of action” is a legal question that comes with heavy historical baggage.
See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing that question); Meier, supra note 5, 721–27,
761–62 (arguing that the best understanding of the Federal Rules, as originally conceived,
is that a plaintiff need not allege all of the facts that constitute a violation). My own sense
of contemporary pleading practice, however, is consistent with what the plaintiffs in
Twombly believed regarding pleading practice, which is that the plaintiffs needed to allege
a conspiracy because conspiracy was an element of their claim. Indeed, the Court’s deci-
sion in Twombly seems to assume this proposition; if the plaintiffs need not have alleged a
conspiracy, then the Twombly decision would indeed be much ado about nothing. Nothing
in the Twombly litigation, however, suggests that the plaintiffs’ problems could have been
avoided by simply amending the complaint and removing the (non-factually specific) alle-
gation of an antitrust agreement.
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (explaining the requirement that the factual conten-
tions in a complaint have evidentiary support).
51. See Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 51, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp.,
313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220), 2003 WL 25629874 (“Plaintiffs
allege upon information and belief that [the defendants] have entered into a contract, com-
bination or conspiracy. . . .”).
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activity suggested the existence of an agreement between the
defendants.52
As I have explained in my previous article, a complaint drafted with
the requisite amount of factual specificity will not be subject to
Twombly’s plausibility analysis.53 Thus, when a plaintiff has direct evi-
dence of the material facts to the case, the plaintiff will avoid Twombly’s
plausibility analysis because the direct evidence will allow the plaintiff to
draft the complaint with the requisite amount of factual specificity.54
When the plaintiff does not have direct evidence at the outset of the liti-
gation, the plaintiff will instead describe the circumstantial evidence that
constitutes the impetus for the plaintiff’s suit.55 In this scenario,
Twombly’s plausibility standard might be triggered.56
The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is thus criti-
cal in understanding Twombly’s plausibility standard. Twombly will only
be triggered when a complaint alleges circumstantial evidence—rather
than a factually specific description—of a material fact.57 Moreover, the
plausibility analysis requires a judge to consider this relationship between
basic and material fact.58 Most commentators seem to appreciate that
plausibility requires an examination of the relationship between basic and
material fact, although this trait of the plausibility analysis is often as-
52. See id. (recounting the specific factual allegations regarding the defendants’ paral-
lel business conduct).
53. See Meier, supra note 5, at 728–33.
54. See id. at 730.
55. See id. at 751.
56. I say “might,” here, because the inclusion of circumstantial evidence in a complaint
should not necessarily trigger Twombly’s plausibility analysis. As I have previously ex-
plained, a distinction must be made between facts that are capable of a factual description
and those that are not. Twombly is an example of the former: The material fact in dispute
concerned whether the defendants had formed an agreement. An agreement can only oc-
cur as the result of real-world interaction, and this real-world interaction can be described
with factual specificity. Thus, for instance, the complaint in Twombly could have alleged
that the Defendants had met at the Marriott Hotel in Waco, Texas, on February 6, 1996, at
which point the Defendants entered into an agreement to refrain from competition. This
hypothetical complaint would not have been subjected to Twombly’s plausibility analysis;
because the actual complaint in Twombly did not provide this factual specificity, however,
the plausibility inquiry was triggered. This situation should be distinguished, however, from
the complaint involved in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The dispositive question in Iqbal concerned
whether the defendants had acted with a discriminatory intent. This is a factual question,
but it is not a factual question that is capable of a specific description. As such, the Court’s
conclusion in Iqbal to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard was erroneous and a reflec-
tion of the Court’s own internal confusion as to what had been decided in Twombly. See
generally Meier, supra note 5, at 752–62.
To summarize, a complaint that is based exclusively on direct evidence will never be
subject to Twombly’s plausibility standard, but a complaint which relies on circumstantial
evidence might—or might not—trigger plausibility. Asking whether a complaint has been
drafted with factual specificity is not the same as asking whether the complaint relies on
circumstantial allegations. It is the former, not the latter, which is controlling in determin-
ing when plausibility is triggered.
57. See Meier, supra note 5, at 751.
58. See id. at 753.
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sumed rather than explicitly identified.59 The more difficult question,
though, is the nature of the judge’s inquiry when considering the relation-
ship between basic and material fact. This inquiry might involve two dif-
ferent analyses, which are explained below.
B. PROBABILITY AND CONFIDENCE
The final foundational topic that needs to be addressed concerns the
difference between a probability analysis and a confidence analysis.60
This distinction is critical yet somewhat elusive, particularly for those
without formal mathematical training. Those readers who find the follow-
ing cursory explanation of this distinction to be insufficient can find a
more thorough examination in my previous work.
Both a probability analysis and a confidence analysis concern the rela-
tionship between facts, but each involves a completely different type of
analysis of this relationship. The distinction between a probability analy-
sis and a confidence analysis is perhaps best demonstrated by first show-
ing how these distinct concepts might apply outside of the litigation
context. A probability analysis is concerned with the likelihood or
probability of a particular fact from a certain state of affairs.61 For in-
stance, if the Kansas City Royals baseball team has played 100 games this
season, and won 60 and lost 40, someone with this information (we will
call him “George”) might conclude that there is a 60% probability that
the Royals will win their next game. This conclusion is based on a
probability analysis.62 From a particular body of evidence or state of af-
fairs (the Royals’ win-loss record to that point in the season), a conclu-
sion is reached regarding the probability of a particular fact (the Royals
winning their next game).63
A confidence analysis, like a probability analysis, requires a determina-
tion regarding the relationship between a “state of affairs” or “evidence”
and a particular fact.64 Under a confidence inquiry, however, this rela-
tionship is viewed from a different perspective. Whereas a probability
analysis considers what the state of affairs indicates about the likelihood
of a particular fact, a confidence analysis addresses whether the state of
affairs is adequate such that there is a requisite degree of confidence in
any probability assessment from the state of affairs.65 In the previous ex-
ample, George concluded that the Royals had a 60% chance of winning
their next game based on the team’s win-loss record. George might also
59. See, e.g., William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical
Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 554 (2011) (discussing the need to fill the “gap” of
the conclusory allegations).
60. I have explored this distinction, in depth, elsewhere. See generally, Meier, supra
note 12; Meier, supra note 11; Meier, supra note 14.
61. See id.
62. See Meier, supra note 11, at 83–85.
63. See id.
64. See Meier, supra note 12, at 749–50.
65. See id.
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conclude, however, that he wants additional information before wagering
a bet with his friend that the Royals will win their next game. In other
words, although George thinks that his probability estimate is accurate
based on the limited information he has considered, he concludes that the
amount of information he has considered is not adequate for the purpose
of deciding whether to wager a bet with his friend or not. Before a wager
is placed, additional information is desired, such as the Royals’ opponent
in the next game, the pitching matchup, the location of the game, etc.66
Whereas a probability analysis requires a somewhat mechanical analy-
sis regarding the relationship between the state of affairs and a particular
fact, a confidence analysis is more complex in that it requires an assess-
ment of the purpose of any probability determination.67 In other words, a
confidence analysis also considers the relationship between facts, but
does so from the perspective of whether certain facts constitute a suffi-
cient basis from which to make a conclusion regarding other facts. A con-
fidence analysis, then, is ultimately a judgment about the adequacy of
information, whereas a probability analysis is about the ultimate exis-
tence of facts.68 Thus, in the Royals example, whereas the process of de-
termining the probability of a victory from the win-loss record could be
statistically resolved, determining what to do with that probability conclu-
sion required a more nuanced analysis that asked what the probability
estimate was going to be used for.69 In the hypothetical, George was de-
ciding whether to place a wager with a friend. Based on the limited infor-
mation he had,70 a bet on the Royals was a good investment; according to
the win-loss record, there was a 60% probability that the Royals would
win. Nevertheless, the bet was refused. George’s refusal to place the bet
might be explained by a variety of logical justifications. George might feel
that if he had more information about the pending game, the probability
assessment of a Royals victory might change.71 For instance, if the Royals
are playing against the best team in the league, and that team is starting
its best pitcher, while the Royals are starting their worst pitcher, the
probability of a Royals victory might change based on this additional in-
formation. Or, George might simply be risk averse. If the proposed bet is
for George’s last ten dollars, George might value retaining that ten dol-
lars more than he values the opportunity to double that money, because
the opportunity to double his money also involves the risk that he will go
broke. Thus, even if the probabilities favor George, he might rationally
conclude that he will not wager the bet. George’s refusal to place the bet
is not based on George’s analysis of the likelihood of a Royal’s victory,
but rather on a more sophisticated conclusion that the amount of infor-
66. See id. at 795.
67. See id. at 796.
68. See id. at 750.
69. See id. at 795–96.
70. I am also assuming that the bet paid “even money,” meaning each party to the bet
was risking an equivalent amount.
71. See Meier, supra note 12, at 795–96.
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mation he has assembled is not sufficient for him to make a decision to
bet.72 It is not that George necessarily thinks the Royals are likely to lose
the following game, it is just that George has so little information that he
does not feel confident enough in the 60% probability estimate to bet.
Turning from baseball to the litigation context, the distinction between
probability and confidence is best illustrated by Professor Laurence
Tribe’s famous blue bus hypothetical:
Consider next the cases in which the identity of the responsible agent
is in doubt. Plaintiff is negligently run down by a blue bus. The ques-
tion is whether the bus belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff is pre-
pared to prove that defendant operates four-fifths of all the blue
buses in town. What effect, if any, should such proof be given?73
There is wide consensus that the blue bus hypothetical requires a
judge-ordered judgment for the defendant.74 However, this conclusion
(like George’s refusal to bet on the Royals) cannot be understood from
the perspective of probability because the limited, available information
suggests that the defendant did, in fact, run over the plaintiff (just like the
limited information suggests that the Royals would, in fact, win their up-
coming game).75 The defendant’s pre-jury victory in the blue bus hypo-
thetical can only be explained through a confidence analysis.76 The
critical issue in the blue bus hypothetical is not the ultimate probability
that the defendant was the tortfeaser but rather the limited information
available from which to make this probability determination.77 There is
so little evidence available that there is an insufficient degree of confi-
dence in the only probability conclusion that is reasonable from the re-
cord.78 The plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of production, not
because we doubt the plaintiff’s factual story, but because the plaintiff
has failed to assemble a sufficient amount of evidence regarding the dis-
puted question of fact.79
A different way in which to understand the confidence principle within
the litigation context is through the old adage that “[a] brick is not a
wall.”80 This familiar quote addresses the relevancy of evidence and
nicely captures the liberal definition of relevancy contained within the
modern Federal Rules of Evidence.81 In addressing the relevancy of par-
72. See id.
73. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 & n.37 (1971) (calling the blue bus hypothetical a
“famous chestnut”).
74. See Meier, supra note 12, at 781–84.
75. See id. at 783.
76. See id. at 793–94.
77. See id. at 783–85.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 339 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
81. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (articulating a broad standard for relevancy as any evidence
having “any tendency to make a [material] fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence”); see also ADVISORY COMM. NOTES TO FED. R. EVID. 401 (citing the
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ticular pieces of evidence, however, the “brick is not a wall” adage does
seem to presuppose that a wall might eventually be necessary. Thus, al-
though an individual piece of evidence might be admissible under the
Rules of Evidence as a single “brick,” the confidence principle requires
that the party with the burden of production (which is almost always the
plaintiff) aggregate enough admissible “bricks” so as to amass at least a
minimal “wall.” Unless the plaintiff has assembled a bare minimum
amount of information—that is, unless the plaintiff has compiled a mini-
mum number of bricks—the plaintiff has not met her burden of
production.
The nature of both the probability and confidence analyses determines
how these tasks are divided between judge and jury.82 The nature of the
confidence analysis requires that this task be assigned to the judge in the
standard civil dispute.83 The confidence inquiry involves a determination
as to how much of the potentially available information has been assem-
bled in the case and also a determination as to the consequences of an
incorrect conclusion.84 Both of these determinations are better resolved
by a judge.85 In particular, the question regarding the consequences of an
incorrect probability conclusion requires a policy or legal analysis that is
simply beyond what can—and should—be expected of a civil jury.86 Only
a judge can determine how “risk averse” a legal system should be regard-
ing an inaccurate litigation conclusion in the standard civil context.87
The task of a jury in a civil dispute is to apply a probability analysis.88
This is evident from the jury instructions given to the jury in civil cases.89
The familiar “preponderance of the evidence” standard governing civil
litigation instructs the jury that it must find for the plaintiff so long as it
concludes that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are more probably true
than not.90 The jury is thus to determine, from the evidence submitted at
trial (the state of affairs), the likelihood of the facts alleged by the plain-
tiff.91 The jury is well-suited to perform this task. As discussed above, a
probability analysis requires a somewhat mechanical analysis of the rela-
tionship between the evidence submitted at trial and the material facts to
the dispute. For direct evidence, this requires an assessment of the credi-
bility of the trial witnesses; for circumstantial evidence, the jury must re-
“brick is not a wall” concept as exemplifying the broad approach to relevancy contained in
Rule 401).
82. See Meier, supra note 12, at 797–98.
83. See id. at 798.
84. See id. at 799.
85. See id. at 805.
86. See id. at 806.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 807.
89. See id. at 761–62.
90. See Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1076 n.5 (listing commentators (and judicial opinions) that associate
the preponderance of the evidence standard with fifty percent probability).
91. See Meier, supra note 12, at 772.
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solve the relationship between the basic facts and the material facts.92 In
either instance, the jury’s real-world experiences are invaluable in per-
forming this probability analysis.93
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,94 however, federal courts—in addition to the jury—are also charged
with employing a probability analysis. Under the “reasonable jury” stan-
dard for summary judgment adopted in Anderson, a judge is to determine
whether a reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion as to the
probability of the material facts in dispute.95 A judge cannot determine
what a reasonable jury could conclude regarding probability without in-
dependently examining the evidentiary record and engaging in a
probability analysis.96 Granted, the nature of the trial judge’s probability
analysis is somewhat deferential; theoretically speaking, the trial judge is
not making a final conclusion with regard to probability but only deter-
mining whether the range of reasonable probability conclusions from the
evidentiary record includes resolutions favoring both the plaintiff and the
defendant.97 That said, although the judge’s analysis of probability at
summary judgment is less exacting and somewhat deferential, the judge is
nevertheless engaged in a probability analysis.98
Thus, under modern federal civil procedure, a judge is expected to per-
form both a confidence analysis and a probability analysis at the pre-trial
stage of a dispute.99  By introducing the plausibility standard in Twombly,
the Court might have been referring to either of these analyses. The
Twombly plausibility standard clearly requires an analysis between the
circumstantial “evidence” or facts pleaded by the plaintiff and the ulti-
mate or material fact necessary for the plaintiff’s recovery.100 Both a
probability analysis and a confidence analysis perform this function. So,
which did the Court intend in Twombly?
Before directly addressing that question, this Article will first consider
the pleading standard adopted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act101 (PSLRA). In the PSLRA, Congress clearly intended for courts to
engage in a probability analysis at the pleadings stage.102 The PSLRA is
thus an example of how a probability standard can function at the plead-
ing stage, and therefore provides an excellent launching point from which
to consider Twombly’s plausibility standard. The PSLRA also illustrates
92. See Meier, supra note 12, at 753–54.
93. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 520
(2002) (“We value juries precisely because they bring real-world experience to bear . . . .”).
94. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
95. Id. at 250–51.
96. See Meier, supra note 12, at 766–67.
97. Id. at 773.
98. See id.
99. After the trial has commenced, a party may move for a judgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50, which explicitly references the reasonable jury standard (unlike Rule
56). See FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
100. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
102. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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the constitutional concerns that arise by permitting a judge to engage in a
probability analysis at the pleadings stage, even if these Seventh Amend-
ment objections were not taken seriously in the Court’s decision in Tel-
labs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.103
II. PROBABILITY AT THE PLEADINGS STAGE: PSLRA AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
In 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA “[a]s a check against abusive
litigation by private parties”104 alleging violations of federal securities
laws. Towards this goal, the PSLRA altered, for securities fraud claims
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,105 the usual plead-
ing requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.106 In order to
recover on a § 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
with “scienter,” which occurs when the defendant had an “intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defaud.”107 Under the PSLRA pleading standard,
a plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”108
There are three components of this pleading requirement. First, in ad-
dition to requiring that the plaintiff plead the defendant’s state of mind,
the plaintiff must plead the facts the plaintiff believes support the plain-
tiff’s conclusion regarding the defendant’s state of mind. Obviously, the
defendant’s state of mind is not an event or occurrence that the plaintiff
(or any witness) will ever have been able to observe firsthand.109 In this
respect, the factual question of a party’s intent will always be different
than the factual question of a real world event such as, for instance, a car
crash. It is possible to have witnesses who directly observed the car crash
and who will be able to describe this event with great particularity. It is
impossible to have “witnesses” who observed a party’s state of mind, with
the exception of the party himself or herself.110 In any event, this require-
103. 551 U.S. 308, 326–27 (2007).
104. Id. at 313.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
106. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319–22 (describing how the PSLRA amends the Federal
Rules).
107. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The Supreme Court has not
answered the question whether reckless behavior, as opposed to intentional deceit, is suffi-
cient for establishing liability under § 10(b). See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 n.3.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
109. See Meier, supra note 5, at 756 (“A person’s state of mind . . . cannot be described
any more specifically . . . other than to say that the state of mind does, or does not, exist.”).
110. At a deep level, even when the party whose intent is in question indicates that he
does, in fact, have the requisite intent through some sort of “smoking gun” admission or
communication, this observation is different than when a witness observes a real world
event. The party who says that he has that intent (for instance, an executive at a publicly
traded company who writes an internal email explaining that his public statement was in-
tended to defraud the public) has not really “observed” that “fact” in the same way that a
witness can observe a car crash. Cf. RENE´ DESCARTES, PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY (1644)
(“[C]ogito, ergo sum . . . .”).  Despite this complexity, this sort of “smoking gun” evidence
is often referred to as direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence, and this characterization
makes some sense. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal
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ment of the PSLRA does not change the operative standard under Fed-
eral Rule 9(b), which requires that “the circumstances constituting fraud”
be pleaded.111
The second component of the PSLRA pleading requirement is that the
facts supporting the plaintiff’s conclusion of scienter must be pled “with
particularity.”112 Here again, this standard traces the heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9(b), which requires that a plaintiff “state with particu-
larity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”113 Note, however,
that the particularity requirement (in both the PSLRA and Rule 9(b))
does not (and cannot) apply to the ultimate question of the defendant’s
scienter. As explained above, this fact is incapable of either direct obser-
vation or a specific, factual description.
The PSLRA departs from the Federal Rules, however, in the third
component of the pleading requirement it establishes. The plaintiff’s par-
ticularly pleaded facts must give rise “to a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind.”114 There is no doubt that this
language requires a judge to do a probability analysis at the pleadings
stage. Indeed, this point is conceded in the Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. decision interpreting the PSLRA.115 In Tellabs, the Court
assumes that the PSLRA requires a judge to perform a probability analy-
sis, and the only question is the degree of probability that must be estab-
lished by the plaintiff.116 On this question, the Court resolved that the
plaintiff “must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as
likely as any plausible opposing inference.”117 The standard applied by
Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 614 n.133 (2000) (listing cases discussing
“direct evidence” in discrimination cases).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). For cases not involving “fraud or mistake,” however, and thus
governed under the generic pleading requirements of Rule 8, I have argued that the likely
intent of the drafters of the Federal Rules was that a plaintiff need not even allege a defen-
dant’s state of mind because this “fact” was not an observable, real world event (unlike, for
instance, the question of whether the light was green or red). See Meier, supra note 5, at
761–62.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
115. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
116. See id. (describing the issue being decided in Tellabs).
117. Id. at 328. In different portions of the opinion, the Court articulates the standard
slightly differently. See id. at 314 (“[A]n inference of scienter . . . must be cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference . . . .”); id. at 324 (“A complaint will survive,
we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts. . . .”); id. at
326 (“[T]he reviewing court must ask: When the allegations are accepted as true and taken
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as
any opposing inference?”). These discrepancies in describing the applicable standards are
sloppy and somewhat maddening. See Stephen Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
“General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 538–39 (2009) (stating that the Court’s opinion in
Tellabs “is hardly a model of precision or consistency in the use of language” and is an
example of what occurs when a writer is concerned with “expressing themselves prettily
[rather than] clearly”). The word “cogent” appears in some articulations but not all, as
does the phrase “reasonable person.”  Each phrase creates some ambiguity regarding the
underlying test.
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Professor Geoffrey Miller has addressed both of these ambiguities in his recent article, A
Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After Tellabs, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
93 (2012). With regard to the “cogent” language, Professor Miller concludes that this lan-
guage should be essentially ignored; although the “cogent” language creates a colorable
argument that the statute compels a court to compare the plaintiff’s version of the facts
with the defendant’s specific versions of the facts, Miller concludes that the true test re-
quires a comparison of the plaintiff’s version of the facts (scienter) versus all other expla-
nations (no scienter). See id. at 94–96; cf. Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical
Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 234–35 (2008) (discussing an “infer-
ence to the best explanation” approach to the jury’s burden of persuasion).
The inclusion of the “reasonable person” phrase in some (but not all) versions of the
Court’s articulation of the PSLRA standard is, perhaps, even more problematic than the
“cogent” language. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324, 326 (stating test with “reasonable person”
language included); id. at 314 (stating the test without the “reasonable person” language).
The “reasonable person” might be read to suggest that a court should take a deferential
approach to the probability question. This is the effect of the “reasonable jury” standard
currently controlling a judge’s summary judgment inquiry. Under the “reasonable jury”
standard, a judge is not to independently—and precisely—determine probability from an
evidentiary record, but rather is to deferentially determine what range of probability con-
clusions would be reasonable from the record. See Meier, supra note 12. It seems doubtful
that the Tellabs Court intended this type of deferential approach for the PSLRA, consider-
ing that the Seventh Circuit standard—reversed by the Court in Tellabs—clearly employed
this approach. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir.
2006) (holding that a plaintiff must “allege[ ] facts from which, if true, a reasonable person
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent”). Indeed, the Supreme Court
seems to explicitly reject this approach when, after quoting the Seventh Circuit approach,
it says: “It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the com-
plaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind. Rather, . . . a court . . . must engage in a
comparative evaluation . . . .” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). Later, the Court
says that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable.” Id.
This language in Tellabs seems to suggest that the “gatekeeping” type of probability analy-
sis that currently occurs at the summary judgment stage is not what is required under the
PSLRA. It is important to note that, in describing the analysis required under the PSLRA,
the Court states that “a court” must resolve the issue instead of deferring to what a “rea-
sonable factfinder” could conclude. Id. Under a “reasonable jury” standard, it is possible to
argue that the jury’s role as factfinder is still preserved because the judge is only taking a
“quick look” at the evidence to see if a jury determination one way or another would be
completely irrational. But see Meier, supra note 12, at 805 (concluding that, although a
“reasonable” standard required the judge to be more deferential to the ultimate jury reso-
lution, the judge’s analysis is nevertheless still a probability analysis that replicates what is
ultimately expected of the jury—if the case makes it that far); Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh
Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 575 (2003)
(“[W]hat is ‘reasonable’ is often in the eyes of the beholder, meaning that the [reasonable
jury] test gives judges more power.”). The Court in Tellabs seems to have rejected this sort
of approach, however, and, if so, there can be no doubt that a judge’s role under the
PSLRA is not to act as a sort of gatekeeper but instead to independently decide the
probability question. See Meier, supra note 12, at 773 n.79 (describing this approach in
mathematical terms, namely, as a “point estimate”). It might be tempting to reason that if
Congress wanted to employ a deferential “reasonable person” or “reasonable jury” ap-
proach in the PSLRA, it could easily have included this language in this statute. This only
gets one so far, however, once one realizes that Rule 56, governing summary judgment,
does not include this “reasonable jury” language, despite the inclusion of this exact lan-
guage in Rule 50 for judgments as a matter of law. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56, with FED.
R. CIV. P. 50.
Despite this (for lack of a better word) mess, the best conclusion appears to be that the
Court in Tellabs intended to reverse the “reasonable person” approach of the Seventh
Circuit in favor of an approach that requires the trial court judge to come to a specific
conclusion regarding the probability of the defendant’s scienter. This is the conclusion that
Professor Miller appears to reach and it appears to be the conclusion of lower courts that
have had to interpret the Tellabs decision. See Miller, supra, at 96–97 & n.18 (discussing
the issue and citing lower court decisions).
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the judge under the PSLRA mirrors the usual burden of persuasion that
guides the jury’s probability analysis at trial, with the exception that
“ties” go to the plaintiff rather than the defendant under the PSLRA.118
Upon first impression, the PSLRA’s requirement that a judge perform
a probability analysis at the pleadings stage might seem ludicrous119: How
can anyone make a probability determination regarding disputed factual
questions based only on the written pleadings? The written pleadings tell
a story, and whether that story is true depends on the evidence that a
party can assemble in support of that story. And, evaluating evidence re-
quires the observation of witnesses, in open court, under oath, while fac-
ing the heat of cross examination. Under this line of thought, the
PSLRA’s probability analysis at the pleadings stage seems misguided and
contrary to the fundamental distinction between written assertions and
evidence.
Upon close inspection, however, there is a logical rationale to the
PSLRA’s pleading approach. Here, the distinction between circumstan-
tial evidence and direct evidence is instructive. Note that the probability
analysis within the PSLRA goes to the issue of the defendant’s state of
mind.120 A defendant’s state of mind is a factual question that, in almost
all instances, will have to be proven by circumstantial evidence. Moreo-
ver, in many instances, the parties will agree on the existence of the cir-
cumstantial evidence, but will simply disagree as to the inferences that
should be drawn from it.
In this situation, it is entirely feasible to engage in a probability analy-
sis—on the issue of scienter—based solely on the pleadings. The critical
I will, however, take objection to one comment by Professor Miller regarding the “rea-
sonable person” approach. Professor Miller concludes that a “reasonable person” ap-
proach is less favorable to a plaintiff because “it is possible that a court, applying its own
judgment, would conclude that the facts alleged do support a strong inference of scienter,
while still accepting that a reasonable person could conclude that the facts do not support a
strong inference of scienter.” Miller, supra, at 97. Here, I believe that Professor Miller has
misapplied the “reasonable person” test. The question is not simply whether a reasonable
person could conclude that there is not scienter, but also whether a reasonable person
could conclude that there is scienter. In other words, so long as the range of “reasonable”
inferences from the evidence crosses over the governing burden of persuasion (usually a
preponderance of the evidence in a civil case), the case must go to the jury. Only if all of
the reasonable probability conclusions are on one side of the governing standard can a
judge enter judgment under a “reasonable person” approach. See generally Meier, supra
note 12. When you consider that a plaintiff can only lose—but cannot win—at the plead-
ings stage under the PSLRA, the plaintiff clearly benefits from whichever standard is more
likely to result in the continuance of the litigation. This is much more likely to occur under
the “reasonable person” standard. Even if a judge believes that the inference of scienter is
less than 50% probable from the plaintiff’s narrative, the judge must allow the case to
proceed under the “reasonable person” standard unless he believes that a probability con-
clusion above 50% would be unreasonable.
118. See Geoffey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 533 (2009)
(stating that ties go to the plaintiff under the Court’s interpretation of the PSLRA in
Tellabs).
119. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J.) (“To judges raised on notice pleading, the idea of drawing a ‘strong inference’
from factual allegations is mysterious.”).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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question is whether one fact should be inferred from the existence of an-
other fact or set of facts: does “Basic Fact A” (or “Basic Facts A, B, C,
etc.”) infer the likely existence of the “Material Fact M”? In making this
determination on the circumstantial evidence, the critical question is
about the real world relationship between the basic facts and the material
fact. Evaluating this relationship requires real world experience and com-
mon sense, but it does not necessarily require an evaluation of anything
that might transpire in a courtroom.
Of course, a dispute about the existence of the circumstantial evidence
(the basic facts) might require a full-blown trial, with competing witnesses
and cross-examination. A dispute about the actual existence of the plain-
tiff’s circumstantial evidence (“Basic Fact A”), then, could not be re-
solved on the pleadings. But the analysis established under the PSLRA
does not anticipate that this type of factual dispute would be resolved at
the pleading stage. This is what the Court meant in Tellabs when it said
that “courts must, as with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a
claim on which relief can be granted, accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true.”121 Of course, this statement sweeps too broadly. The
issue of the defendant’s scienter in a securities fraud case is a factual
question, and the plaintiff will have alleged that the defendant had the
illegal scienter. Accepting this factual allegation as true renders moot the
entire probability analysis established under the PSLRA. What the Tel-
labs Court obviously meant by this statement is that the existence of the
plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence on the scienter question must be ac-
cepted as true. Once the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence is accepted as
true, the remaining step is to determine whether the story told by the
plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence creates the likely inference that the de-
fendant acted with an illegal state of mind. This probability analysis can
be done solely on the pleadings.
Judge Posner’s decision in the Tellabs litigation, on remand from the
Supreme Court, illustrates how it is possible to do this probability analy-
sis solely from the circumstantial evidence (the truth of which is assumed)
contained in the plaintiff’s complaint.122 The brunt of Judge Posner’s
analysis is as follows:
The critical question, therefore, is how likely it is that the allegedly
false statements that we quoted earlier in this opinion were the result
of merely careless mistakes at the management level based on false
information fed it from below, rather than of an intent to deceive or
a reckless indifference to whether the statements were misleading. It
is exceedingly unlikely. The 5500 and the 6500 were Tellabs’s most
important products. The 5500 was described by the company as its
“flagship” product and the 6500 was the 5500’s heralded successor.
They were to Tellabs as Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft.
That no member of the company’s senior management who was in-
121. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
122. See generally Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir.
2008).
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volved in authorizing or making public statements about the demand
for the 5500 and 6500 knew that they were false is very hard to credit
. . . .123
Judge Posner’s analysis of the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence on the
defendant’s scienter is rational and persuasive. Most importantly, though,
it does not seem to be impaired by the absence of post-pleading proceed-
ings in the courts below.124
There is some irony to the fact that Judge Posner authored the Seventh
Circuit opinion on remand in Tellabs, in which he analyzed probability
solely from the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. In Posner’s sec-
ond edition of his critically acclaimed book “Antitrust Law,”125 he advo-
cates for a modernization of the antitrust trial in a way that roughly
mirrors the PSLRA’s approach to scienter. Under Posner’s proposal,
“each party would prepare a chronological narrative of the facts material
to his case”126 and “[t]he parties would then sit down together and, to the
extent possible, hammer out an agreed-upon narrative of the relevant
facts.”127 This narrative would then “be presented to the trier of fact in a
writing that would constitute the basic trial record.”128 If the parties
agreed upon the existence of these basic facts, but simply disagreed over
the inferences that should be drawn from them, Judge Posner’s approach
would completely eliminate the need for a traditional trial.129 The jury
would be presented with the narrative and asked to make inferences
therefrom.130
Judge Posner’s antitrust proposal is the same as the approach of the
PSLRA in that both recognize that a traditional trial is unnecessary when
the disputed question concerns the inferences to be made from agreed-
upon facts. Of course, Judge Posner recognized that the parties will not
always agree on the basic facts or “narrative” of the case, and in those
instances Posner conceded that a full-blown trial will be necessary.131
Under the PSLRA, this issue is avoided at the pleadings stage by assum-
ing the existence of the basic facts as pled by the plaintiff.132 In this sense,
then, at least at the pleadings stage of a securities fraud case, there will be
123. Id. at 709.
124. In addition, if a plaintiff knows (as, for instance, in the case of the PSLRA) that
her circumstantial evidence will be subjected to a judicial probability analysis at the plead-
ings stage, she can include in the complaint all of the circumstances justifying the plaintiff’s
conclusion regarding the existence of the material fact, thus assisting the judge’s
probability inquiry. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of
Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature
of Rules, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 30 (2010) (stating that plaintiffs can react to a pleadings
probability requirement “by producing more ‘evidence’ in their pleadings”).
125. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
126. Id. at 283.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 284 (describing how his proposal could eliminate the need for a full-
blown trial in some cases).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 283–84 (describing when a full-blown trial would be necessary).
132. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
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no dispute regarding the “narrative of the case” because the truth of the
narrative told by the plaintiff will be assumed.
Thus, the knee-jerk reaction by some against a pleadings stage
probability analysis must be dismissed.133 It is possible, at the pleadings
stage, to consider whether an inference is probable from an assumed set
of circumstantial evidence.
Resolving that it is possible to do the probability analysis required by
the PSLRA is quite different, however, from concluding that this analysis
is constitutional under the Seventh Amendment.134 Here again, compar-
ing the PSLRA to Judge Posner’s antitrust proposal is useful, but now an
important distinction between the two should be drawn. Under Judge
Posner’s proposal, a full-blown trial is unnecessary, but the jury is pre-
served as the entity that decides the inferences from the circumstantial
evidence.135 Under the PSLRA, a probability analysis is also done with-
out a trial but it is the judge, rather than the jury, that performs this
analysis.136
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court summarily concluded that the
probability analysis required under the PSLRA does not intrude upon
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.137 The
Court’s analysis in support of this conclusion, however, is wholly
unpersuasive.
The Tellabs Court appeared to make three separate arguments in favor
of the constitutionality of the PSLRA procedure. First, the Court stated
that “Congress, as creator of federal statutory claims, has power to pre-
scribe what must be pleaded to state the claim, just as it has power to
determine what must be proved to prevail on the merits.”138 Under this
view, apparently, because Congress has the power to create the cause of
action, it has complete authority to define the procedures to be used in
adjudicating this action, including having a judge make a determination
of probability at the pleadings stage. Stated differently: “Plaintiffs, quit
complaining! You are lucky you have this cause of action in the first
place, and remember that Congress could always take it away from you!”
This argument, of course, would severely undermine the Seventh Amend-
ment.139 Could Congress decide that all statutorily created causes of ac-
133. See authorities cited supra note 8.
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.”).
135. See POSNER, supra note 125, at 283–84.
136. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.
137. Id. at 326–30.
138. Id. at 327.
139. Although the Court frames its argument in terms of the authority Congress has to
create the cause of action in the first place, there is seemingly no reason that this same
rationale would not apply to all causes of actions in our post-Erie world in which law
derives from political authority. Does the Court anticipate that the Seventh Amendment
would apply differently to a state statutory claim adjudicated in federal court?  To a torts
or contracts claim under the common law in federal court?  The Court has seemingly con-
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tion be tried wholly to a judge based only on the pleadings? Of course
not,140 but the Court’s argument would seem to sanction this result. After
all, Congress created the cause of action in the first place, right? The real-
ity is that once Congress has created a cause of action, and the adjudica-
tion of that cause of action requires a determination on disputed
questions of fact, the Seventh Amendment preserves the jury as the en-
tity that will resolve those disputed questions of fact.141 As eloquently
stated by Professors Michael Kaufman and John Wunderlich, “Congress
cannot use the subterfuge of pleading to allow a judge to make factual
determinations that would otherwise be constitutionally required to be
resolved by a jury.”142
The Court’s second argument in Tellabs in favor of the constitutionality
of the PSLRA was based on precedent: “No decision of this Court . . .
suggests . . . that the Seventh Amendment inhibits Congress from estab-
lishing whatever pleading requirements it finds appropriate for federal
statutory claims.”143 To support this assertion, the Court first noted that it
had previously sanctioned the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b).144 While this is true, the PSLRA is different than Rule 9(b) in a
manner that is pertinent to the constitutional issue. The PSLRA requires
a judge not just to determine whether certain facts have been pleaded
with particularity, but also to determine whether the judge believes those
facts infer the likely existence of an additional fact.145 In this sense, it is
misleading to characterize the approach under the PSLRA as turning on
“what must be pleaded to state the claim.”146 A plaintiff who loses under
the PSLRA does not lose because what he has written in his complaint is
itself inadequate, but rather because the judge believes that a certain in-
ference is not likely from what has been written. The Court’s description
of the PSLRA approach as depending simply on what must be pleaded,
then, is somewhat disingenuous.147 The heightened pleading requirement
flated the uncontroversial notion that Congress has power to amend the procedure rules
governing federal courts with the incorrect view that Congress has power to amend the
procedural requirements of the Seventh Amendment. Congress (acting through the Su-
preme Court Rules Committee) can establish a uniform set of procedural rules to be used
by the federal courts, and Congress can deviate from that approach when it sees fit. But
Congress cannot deviate from the procedural requirements of the Seventh Amendment.
See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998).
140. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (“Whatever doubt may have existed
should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statu-
tory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.”).
141. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962).
142. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Reme-
dies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72 (2012).
143. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327.
144. See id.
145. See supra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
146. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327.
147. The Court’s description of the PSLRA standard as merely a pleading standard is
somewhat analogous to a jury explaining its verdict as a by-product of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. For instance, a juror might explain his conclusion by stating that that one party
“failed to enter evidence showing the probability of that party’s assertion.” In reality, how-
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of both Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA requires an examination of the four
corners of the plaintiff’s complaint, but the PSLRA goes one step further,
and therein lays the potential constitutional problem under the Seventh
Amendment. The Tellabs Court’s comparison of the PSLRA to Rule 9(b)
completely misses the constitutional problem, which is not that a plaintiff
might have to draft his complaint with a heightened factual specificity,
but that a judge is determining probability.
The Court also cites to its previous decision in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. United States148 as undermining the constitutional attack on
the PSLRA.149 This argument is, like the misplaced reliance on Rule
9(b), off target. I have discussed the Fidelity decision at length else-
where,150 and will thus simply repeat the primary conclusions from that
examination: The Fidelity case involved a pre-trial judgment against a
party pursuant to a confidence, rather than a probability, analysis.151 The
problem in Fidelity was not that the Court disbelieved the losing party’s
position and evidence, as might occur under a PSLRA analysis.152
Rather, in Fidelity, the Court simply concluded—as a matter of law and
policy—that the losing party had not produced the necessary amount of
evidence to support his position.153 Thus, the Fidelity case is irrelevant
when considering the probability analysis required under the PSLRA.154
The Tellabs Court’s final argument in favor of the constitutionality of
the PSLRA was the most bizarre of the three. The Court concluded its
discussion of the Seventh Amendment by emphasizing that “a plaintiff is
not forced to plead more than she would be required to prove at trial.”155
The Court can make this assertion, of course, only because the Court—
rather curiously—resolved that the probability standard under the
PSLRA falls just short of the usual burden of persuasion at trial.156
Under the PSLRA standard, a plaintiff advances if the trial court judge
believes her evidence to be fifty percent probable,157 while at trial the
plaintiff loses unless the jury is convinced that her version of the facts is
ever, the juror simply did not believe the evidence introduced by that party, and couching
his conclusion in terms of the failure to admit certain evidence is simply a roundabout way
of expressing that conclusion.
148. See generally Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
149. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327 (citing Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320).
150. See generally Meier, supra note 11.
151. See id. at 54–55.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. The Fidelity case is, however, directly on point when considering the constitution-
ality of Twombly’s plausibility standard. The Twombly standard requires a court to engage
in a confidence analysis. As the Fidelity holding makes clear, a confidence analysis does not
implicate the Seventh Amendment in the same way that a probability analysis does. These
issues are explored more fully in Section III.C.
155. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007).
156. See id. at 328–29.
157. See id. at 328.
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more probable than the defendant’s.158 In other words, ties go to the
plaintiff at the pleadings stage (under the PSLRA approach) but to the
defendant at trial.159
The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Alito, respectively,
would each have applied the usual preponderance standard, under which
ties go to the defendant.160 Justice Scalia’s concurrence, in particular, is
sharply critical of the majority’s conclusion, and makes several persuasive
arguments that undermine whether the Court’s “ties go the plaintiff” ap-
proach can be justified as a fair interpretation of the PSLRA.161 Consid-
ering the doubt raised by Justice Scalia as to whether Congress truly
intended a “ties go the plaintiff” PSLRA standard, it seems likely that the
Tellabs Court attached considerable Seventh Amendment significance to
being able to say that “a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she
would be required to prove at trial.”162
Here again, though, the Court has misunderstood the fundamental Sev-
enth Amendment concern.163 The problem is that a judge is doing a
probability analysis that might resolve the case. This concern is not obvi-
ated by the fact that this probability analysis can only work in one party’s
favor and that the standard by which this probability will be measured is
less than the standard that party would have to meet at trial.
To demonstrate, consider a hypothetical new procedure by which a
plaintiff, before proceeding to trial, must first independently convince
three separate judges that the plaintiff’s factual assertions are, more likely
than not, true. The first leg of the gauntlet is before the least senior judge,
and this judge has two options: either enter judgment against the plaintiff
(if the judge believes the plaintiff’s facts are not more likely than not) or
allow the case to proceed to a second judge. If the case makes it to the
second judge, she has the same options as did the first judge but is in no
way bound by the prior decision. Supposing that the plaintiff survives the
second leg of this gauntlet, the litigation proceeds to the third judge. The
third judge has a similar decision: Enter judgment against the plaintiff or
allow the plaintiff to proceed to a jury trial.
I hope that every reader concludes that this rather extreme example
would constitute a violation of the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. The
plaintiff, in essence, must independently convince four separate fact-find-
158. See id. at 328–29; see also Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 808
(2012) (“In practice, individuals’ beliefs are associated with requisite probabilities that de-
pend on the circumstances.”).
159. See Miller, supra note 117, at 533 (stating that ties to go the plaintiff under the
Court’s interpretation of the PSLRA in Tellabs).
160. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329–33 (Scalia, J., concurring); Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 333–34
(Alito, J., concurring) (articulating a standard under which ties go to the defendant rather
than the plaintiff).
161. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329–33 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s
conclusion in terms of Congress’s likely intent upon passing the PSLRA).
162. Id. at 328 (majority opinion).
163. See id. at 326–27.
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ers before winning a recovery.164 A plaintiff cannot win this litigation un-
less, after surviving the three-judge gauntlet, the jury believes that his
evidence makes his version of the facts more likely than not. However, a
plaintiff might lose his case, on the facts, before ever reaching a jury. By
allowing the three judges to independently determine probability and
enter judgment against the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s constitutional right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment has been infringed.
Does this conclusion change by lowering the probability standard that
each of the three judges applies? For instance, suppose in our hypotheti-
cal that each of our judges was only to ask whether the plaintiff’s version
of the facts was 30% likely? Obviously, the plaintiff would prefer this
version of our hypothetical to that in which each judge was applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard. But, from a constitutional
standpoint, it is difficult to discern why the second version of our hypo-
thetical is any less a violation of the Seventh Amendment than is the first
version. Under either standard, a plaintiff might lose a case, on the facts,
before ever reaching the jury. According to the Court’s reasoning in Tel-
labs, however, the less demanding probability standard in the second va-
riation of our hypothetical is important to the Seventh Amendment
analysis. This reasoning simply fails to appreciate the underlying constitu-
tional concern, which derives not from the burden of persuasion gov-
erning a judge’s probability analysis, but rather from the fact that the trial
court judge is engaging in a probability analysis in a manner that can end
the litigation.
Ultimately, my aim in this article is not to resolve the constitutionality
of the pleading regime of the PSLRA. Rather, the PSLRA is being used
in this Article simply as a means to an end—the correct interpretation of
Twombly’s plausibility standard. Whereas the PSLRA undoubtedly es-
tablishes a probability analysis at the pleadings stage, the analysis re-
quired by Twombly’s plausibility standard is less clear. In the next
section, I argue that Twombly’s plausibility analysis requires a confidence
analysis rather than a probability analysis. This argument will depend, in
part, on the conclusions reached in this section regarding the PSLRA. As
this section demonstrates, the probability analysis required by the
PSLRA raises—at the very least—serious constitutional concerns under
the Seventh Amendment. The constitutional concerns that arise under
the PSLRA, however, can be completely avoided if Twombly is inter-
preted to require a confidence, rather than probability, analysis.
III. CONFIDENCE AT THE PLEADINGS STAGE: TWOMBLY’S
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
The Twombly litigation involved a class action suit on behalf of sub-
scribers of local telephone and internet services against major telecom-
164. To use Professor Kaplow’s terminology, this is an extreme example of a type of
“multistage adjudication.” See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1186 (using the term).
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munications providers.165 The suit alleged violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits “every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”166
The plaintiffs in Twombly did not have any direct evidence that the de-
fendants had entered into an illegal antitrust agreement; this is evidenced
by the fact that the plaintiffs were not able to describe this purported real
world event with any factual specificity.167 Instead, the plaintiffs pleaded
“upon information and belief” that this agreement had occurred based on
the parallel business conduct of the defendants, an event that the plain-
tiffs were able to describe in meticulous detail.168 Although independent
parallel conduct is not itself illegal under antitrust law, previous cases had
established that the existence of parallel conduct was probative evidence
as to whether an illegal conspiracy or agreement had actually taken
place.169
The district court dismissed the complaint in Twombly,170 and this deci-
sion was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court.171 In justifying this
result, the Court introduced the plausibility test.172 This much is clear
about the plausibility test in Twombly: the critical inquiry concerns the
relationship between the circumstantial evidence described in the plead-
ings and the ultimate fact that the plaintiff must prove in order to recover
from the defendant. In Twombly, this meant that the plausibility analysis
considered the relationship between the circumstantial evidence of paral-
lel conduct and the purported agreement alleged by the plaintiffs. What is
not clear from Twombly, however, is whether the plausibility analysis re-
quires that this relationship between circumstantial evidence and ultimate
fact be viewed from the perspective of probability or confidence. In other
words, was the problem in Twombly that the Court doubted the ultimate
existence of the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs? If so, Twombly’s
plausibility test is—like the PSLRA standard—a probability analysis. Or,
rather, was the problem in Twombly that the Court did not think that
parallel business conduct was a sufficient amount of information from
which to infer an agreement? In other words, did the Twombly Court
believe that, although parallel conduct was an admissible brick, it did not
constitute a sufficient wall sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of
production? Most commentators have presumed that Twombly re-
quires—like the PSLRA—a probability analysis.173 This view, however, is
incorrect.
165. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
166. Id. (quoting Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1).
167. See id. at 552.
168. See id. at 550–51.
169. See id. at 556.
170. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2005).
171. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
172. See id. at 556.
173. See supra notes 3 & 8.
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A. EITHER A PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OR A CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS
CAN BE PERFORMED AT THE PLEADINGS STAGE
First, it is important to establish that there is no practical impediment
to a judge performing either a probability analysis or a confidence analy-
sis at the pleadings stage; both analyses can be done without the develop-
ment of an evidentiary record or a full-blown trial. Thus, the familiar
argument that the plausibility standard compels a judge to perform an
analysis that cannot be done at the pleadings stage is simply wrong.174
The previous section discussing the PSLRA demonstrated how a
probability analysis can occur at the pleadings stage.175 The PSLRA re-
quires a judge to consider the probability of the defendant’s scienter
based on the circumstantial evidence pled—and assumed true—in the
plaintiff’s complaint.176 This inquiry will necessarily be guided by the
judge’s experience and common sense. Inferring material facts from basic
facts does not require a determination regarding the credibility of con-
flicting witnesses, and thus, there is no need to conduct a full-blown trial
in this instance.
If Twombly requires a probability analysis, the inquiry would—similar
to the PSLRA—require a determination as to the inferences to be made
from circumstantial evidence, which can easily be determined at the
pleadings stage. Recall that Twombly’s plausibility standard is only trig-
gered when a plaintiff has failed to describe a real world event with a
sufficient amount of factual specificity and has instead pleaded the cir-
cumstantial evidence that constitutes the basis for the plaintiff’s belief
that the fact exists.177 If Twombly requires a probability analysis, it is only
regarding the probability of the material fact from the circumstantial evi-
dence asserted by the plaintiff in the complaint.178 Like the PSLRA
probability requirement, and as Judge Posner recognized with regard to
his proposal for the simplification of antitrust trials, this process of deter-
mining probability from circumstantial evidence can be done based on
the written narrative contained in the plaintiff’s complaint.179 Of course,
asking a trial court judge to engage in a probability analysis when each
party has conflicting, direct evidence regarding the material fact in ques-
tion would be absurd at the pleadings stage; interpreting Twombly ac-
cording to a probability analysis does not require this ridiculous act.
Plausibility can only be triggered when a party has failed to describe a
material fact with factual specificity in the complaint, and this occurs only
when a plaintiff is relying solely on circumstantial evidence of a material
fact.180
174. See supra note 9.
175. See supra Part II.
176. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
177. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007).
178. See id.
179. See POSNER, supra note 125, at 284.
180. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 585.
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To demonstrate that it is possible to perform a confidence analysis at
the pleadings stage of litigation, it is first necessary to understand how a
pleadings confidence analysis could work. Recall that a confidence analy-
sis involves a determination about the quantity of evidence on a disputed
point rather than the probability estimate that can be drawn from that
evidence.181 Thus, in the Royals hypothetical discussed earlier in this Ar-
ticle, George decided not to wager that the Royals would win their up-
coming game, even though the available evidence suggested that they
probably would, because George was not satisfied that he had a sufficient
amount of information from which to decide. Similarly, Professor Tribe’s
blue bus hypothetical required that summary judgment be entered
against the plaintiff, even though the summary judgment record sug-
gested that the defendant probably owned the bus that had injured the
plaintiff, because there was not a sufficient amount of information to jus-
tify sending the case to the jury.
A confidence analysis, at the pleadings stage, would analyze whether
the circumstantial evidence pleaded in the plaintiff’s complaint consti-
tuted a sufficient amount of evidence regarding the material fact to the
litigation that the plaintiff ultimately needed to prove.182 This question as
to whether the plaintiff had “enough” evidence could be analyzed two
different ways.
First, a court could ask whether the circumstantial evidence described
in the plaintiff’s complaint would constitute a sufficient amount of evi-
dence such that the plaintiff could survive the court’s confidence analysis
at the summary judgment stage.183 At the summary judgment stage, a
confidence analysis asks whether there is a sufficient amount of informa-
tion such that we can have a requisite level of confidence in any determi-
nation made by the jury.184 A confidence analysis, at the pleadings stage,
could simply move this inquiry up in the litigation.185 Under this view,
then, a court employing a confidence analysis at the pleadings stage
would ask whether the circumstantial evidence pleaded in the complaint
would be a sufficient quantity of evidence to permit the plaintiff to pro-
ceed past summary judgment to a jury determination.186
Of course, this view of a pleadings confidence analysis undermines the
significance of discovery. Under this version of the pleadings confidence
analysis, the plaintiff would be required to have a sufficient amount of
evidence—at the outset of the case—to satisfy the plaintiff’s confidence
181. See Meier, supra note 12, at 778–94.
182. Recall (1) that a complaint drafted with sufficient factual specificity will not be
subject to a plausibility analysis, (2) that a plaintiff with direct evidence of a material fact
will be able to satisfy the factual specificity requirement because he will be able to describe
the material fact with factual detail, and (3) that a plausibility analysis will thus only be
triggered when a plaintiff has (at the outset of the case) only circumstantial evidence re-
garding a material fact to the litigation. See generally Meier, supra note 12, at 753–56.
183. See id. at 750–51.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 754–58.
186. See id.
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burden at summary judgment.187 Another view of a pleadings confidence
inquiry, however, would apply a more lenient confidence analysis to the
plaintiff at the pleadings stage than at the summary judgment stage.
Under this view, the judge would not ask whether the plaintiff’s evidence
would satisfy the confidence burden at summary judgment, but instead
would ask whether the plaintiff has a sufficient amount of evidence at the
outset of the litigation so as to allow the litigation to proceed to discov-
ery. This type of confidence analysis could turn, for example, on the cost
of allowing the case to proceed to discovery or the likelihood that discov-
ery would lead to the type of evidence that would satisfy the plaintiff’s
summary judgment confidence burden.188
Later in this Article, I will briefly return to a discussion of how a confi-
dence analysis might function at the pleadings stage. For now, though, it
is important to note that a confidence analysis—like a probability analy-
sis—can be performed at the pleadings stage; a judge does not need live
testimony or cross examination, in open court, to determine whether the
plaintiff has pleaded a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence to sat-
isfy any confidence burden that might apply at the pleadings stage.
Thus, the familiar objection to Twombly’s plausibility requirement as
beyond the capacity of a judge at the pleadings stage of litigation is sim-
ply misplaced. Either way, the judge has to analyze the relationship be-
tween the circumstantial evidence alleged by the plaintiff (which is
assumed true) and the material fact to the litigation, and a judge can ana-
lyze this relationship from the perspective of either probability or confi-
dence without the need for actual evidence or testimony.
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF THE WORD “PLAUSIBLE”
In attempting to determine the type of analysis required under
Twombly’s plausibility standard, the natural place to start is the Twombly
opinion.189 Unfortunately, the manner in which the Court described
“plausibility” in Twombly does little to resolve whether a probability or
confidence analysis is required under the plausibility analysis.190
In introducing the plausibility standard, the Court strongly disavows
the notion that the standard requires a probability analysis: “[a]sking for
plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage.”191 Moreover, the Court proceeds to
comment that the plausibility inquiry involves a determination as to
whether “enough fact[s]” have been pleaded.192 An analysis involving the
187. See id.
188. See id. at 805–10 (discussing the policy concerns informing a confidence analysis).
189. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
190. See id. at 555–56.
191. Id. at 556 (“And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes
a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable and ‘that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.’”).
192. Id. at 556; see also id. at 570 (stating that a complaint must contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its fact”) (emphasis added).
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quanta of facts is a confidence analysis. In the Royals example, George
decided not to place a wager because he felt that he did not have the
necessary amount of information from which to decide.
Other portions of the Twombly opinion, however, suggest that the
plausibility analysis does require a probability analysis, despite the
Court’s pronouncement to the contrary.193 For instance, the Court states
that the dispositive inquiry is whether the complaint crosses “the line be-
tween possibility and plausibility.”194 This phrase suggests that “possibil-
ity” and “plausibility” are measuring the same quality—probability—with
plausibility simply being a more demanding measure.195 For instance,
Professor Bahadur reasons that equating “possibility” with “plausibility”
must mean that Twombly’s plausibility standard involves a probability
analysis:
The Court’s use of the term “possibility,” however, belies the asser-
tion that plausibility is not a probability analysis because possibility
is an expression of probability. . . . [T]he Court’s necessary mathe-
matical conclusion is that the probability of [the dispositive fact] is
greater than 0% but not probabilistically high enough to be plausi-
ble. Plausibility is therefore achieved when the complaint reaches a
threshold level of probability . . . .196
Other language in the Twombly opinion describing the plausibility
analysis also creates the impression that it requires probability rather
than confidence.197
The schizophrenic nature of the Court’s description of the plausibility
analysis mirrors how the term “plausibility” is used in non-legal settings.
The term “plausible,” as it is commonly defined, can mean either
probability or confidence—or both.
In some instances, the word “probability” or “confidence” will appear
within the definition of “plausible.” Consider the following definition:
“seeming reasonable or probable.”198 Pointing in the other direction is
the following definition of plausibility: “well-spoken and apparently, but
193. See id. at 557.
194. Id.; see also id. at 570 (stressing the need for a plaintiff to cross the “line from
conceivable to plausible”).
195. See id. at 557.
196. Bahadur, supra note 8, at 456–57.
197. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549 (stating that a complaint should be dismissed when
there is no “factual context suggesting [an] agreement”); id. at 556 (describing the relevant
inquiry as “identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render a §1 conspiracy plausi-
ble”); id. at 557 (declaring that “parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy”; that allega-
tions of parallel conduct “must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a
preceding agreement”; and that “for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with) agreement”); id. at 557 & n.5 (describing Twombly as a case involving the line “be-
tween the factually neutral and the factually suggestive”). The term “suggest” is consistent
with a probability analysis. See Suggest definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTION-
ARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suggest (last visited May 18, 2015) (de-
fining “suggest” as “to mention or imply as a possibility”).
198. See Plausible Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY (2002) (emphasis added).
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often deceptively, worthy of confidence or trust.”199 Other definitions do
not employ the term probability or confidence but nevertheless seem to
incorporate both the probability concept and the confidence concept
within the same definition. For instance, Random House Webster’s Col-
lege Dictionary defines plausible as: “having an appearance of truth or
reason; credible; believable.”200  The “appearing true” portion of this def-
inition is consistent with a probability analysis, as a probability analysis is
concerned only with the likelihood of particular facts. On the other hand,
the “appearing . . . believable” definition is much more consistent with a
confidence definition; whether someone chooses to “believe” in the exis-
tence of a particular fact requires an assessment of what is at stake.201
Recall the hypothetical involving George, who was trying to make a deci-
sion as to whether to place a wager on an upcoming Royals game with a
friend. George decided not to “believe” that that the Royals would win
their next game, even though the limited information available suggested
that there was a 60% chance they would, because George either wanted
additional information regarding the upcoming game or because George
was risk averse.202 Consider also the following definition: “[s]eemingly or
apparently valid, likely, or acceptable.”203 Here again, the “likely” com-
ponent suggests a probability analysis. Whether something is “valid” or
“acceptable,” however, depends on context: What are the consequences
of determining that something is “valid” or “acceptable”? What is the
information going to be used for? What are the consequences of an erro-
neous probability determination? These questions are more akin to a
confidence analysis rather than a probability analysis.
In short, the everyday manner in which the term “plausibility” is used
in ordinary language does little in resolving whether a probability or con-
fidence analysis is required under Twombly. Indeed, the Supreme Court
could not have picked a more ambiguous word with regard to the distinc-
tion between probability and confidence.
The Supreme Court’s subsequent cases discussing or applying the plau-
sibility standard also do little towards distinguishing between a
probability and confidence analysis. The most extensive discussion of the
199. See Plausible Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.reference.com/
browse/plausible?s=t (last visited May 18, 2015) (emphasis added).
200. See Plausible Definition, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1035
(1992).
201. See RICHARD W. WRIGHT, PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 81 (R. Goldberg ed.,
2011) (“[A] mere statistical probability, no matter how high, will not suffice in the absence
of the required conviction or belief in the truth of the facts at issue.”); cf. Kaplow, supra
note 158, at 808 (“In practice, individuals’ beliefs are associated with requisite probabilities
that depend on the circumstances.”).
202. See also Plausible Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plausible (last visited May 18, 2015) (defining plau-
sible as “appearing worthy of belief”); Plausible Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY (2005) (defining plausible as follows: “Of an argument or statement seeming
reasonable or probable”).
203. See WIKTIONARY.COM, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/plausible (last visited May 18,
2015).
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plausibility standard occurred in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.204  The Iqbal litigation
was commenced by several individuals who had been arrested and de-
tained by federal officials after the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks.205 The plaintiffs claimed that John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller
had been involved in shaping the government’s post-9/11 policy and that
their involvement had been fueled by an unconstitutional discriminatory
animus.206 In support of this allegation of discriminatory intent, and in
the absence of direct evidence of this alleged discriminatory intent, the
plaintiffs alleged a host of facts which suggested that the policy might
have been fueled by racial animus.207 As in Twombly, it is clear that the
Iqbal Court was using plausibility as a measure of the relationship be-
tween the circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination alleged in the
complaint and the ultimate fact of the defendants’ discriminatory intent.
Also like Twombly, however, it is unclear whether the Iqbal Court was
considering this relationship from the perspective of probability or
confidence.208
In describing the plausibility analysis, the Iqbal Court rehabilitated
some of the contradictory language from the Twombly opinion. For in-
stance, the Court stated that the “plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement.’”209 Immediately after disclaiming a probability
analysis, however, the Court stated that plausibility required “more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”210 A discussion
of the “sheer possibility” that a defendant has acted illegally sounds very
much like a probability analysis.211
The Court’s subsequent citations to Twombly are similarly unhelpful.
In addition to Iqbal, the Supreme Court has cited Twombly five times. In
terms of delineating between probability and confidence, the Court’s
opinion in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano212 is the most noteworthy be-
cause the Court applied Twombly’s plausibility analysis and the PSLRA
probability approach to different elements of the same complaint. The
204. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
205. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, NO. 04-01809 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2005).
206. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668–69.
207. See id. at 681–84.
208. There is a compelling argument that the Iqbal Court was employing “plausibility”
as a term of confidence, particularly considering the rather complicated jurisprudence that
has developed regarding the burden of production and the quantity of evidence that must
be submitted in a civil rights cases. See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing
Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103,
104–06 (2005) (discussing the complex set of rules regarding the burden of production in
Title VII discrimination cases). In any event, as I have explained in a previous article, the
Iqbal Court misapplied the Twombly decision on the question of when a plausibility analy-
sis is required. The Iqbal Court erred in proceeding to a plausibility analysis, which some-
what undermines the importance of the way in which the Court applied the plausibility test
in that case. The Iqbal Court should never have even gotten to this point. See Meier, supra
note 5, at 755–56.
209. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
210. See id.
211. See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
212. See generally Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
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suit involved a § 10(b) securities fraud claim, which required the plaintiffs
to prove that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omis-
sion and that the defendant acted with scienter.213 In Matrixx, the plain-
tiffs’ complaint had been dismissed on the theory that the materiality and
scienter elements were lacking.214 In reversing, the Supreme Court ap-
plied Twombly’s plausibililty standard to the materiality question215 and
PSLRA’s probability requirement to the question of the defendant’s
scienter.216
Constitutional objections aside, the application of the PSLRA standard
to the scienter question in Matrixx was straightforward and not notewor-
thy. The Court’s application of plausibility to the materiality question,
however, is puzzling because “materiality” is not a question of historical
fact like the alleged antitrust agreement in Twombly or the alleged dis-
criminatory intent in Iqbal. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to determine
why the Matrixx Court was even applying the plausibility standard.217
213. See id. at 1318.
214. See id. at 1317.
215. See id. at 1322–23.
216. See id. at 1323–24.
217. There is no question that the question of whether a misrepresentation is “mate-
rial” is a question of law; the concept of “materiality” is a legal concept and not a fact that
did—or did not—exist in the real world. Whether a misrepresentation occurred is a ques-
tion of fact, but distinguishing material misrepresentations from nonmaterial misrepresen-
tations requires a legal analysis. See id.
Within the context of securities, there are a multitude of legal definitions of this concept.
See Recent Case, Securities Law—Materiality Requirement—Second Circuit Finds Issuer’s
Failure to Disclose Loan Impairments Immaterial as a Matter of Law—Hutchison v.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., 647 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1282,
1286–88 (2012) (discussing the different definitions of “materiality” in the securities con-
text). The Supreme Court crafted a uniform approach to determining “materiality” for all
securities litigation in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Under
the “objective” approach articulated in TSC Industries, the question is whether the misrep-
resentation might affect the decision of a “reasonable” recipient of that information. See
id. at 445. Thus, with regard to proxy statements to shareholders, the Court has stated that
the materiality exists “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id. at 449.  Similarly, in the context
of a company’s misrepresentation about a potential merger, the Court has stated that “ma-
teriality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld
or misrepresented information.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988). The
Court’s articulation of the materiality test in Basic is sometimes referred to as to the “total
mix” standard. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1322.
In Matrixx, the Court rejected the bright-line rule, proposed by the defendants, that
“reports of adverse events associated with a pharmaceutical company’s products cannot be
material absent a sufficient number of such reports to establish a statistically significant
risk that the product is in fact causing the events.” Id. at 1318–19. Instead, the Court said
that the materiality question will depend upon the “contextual inquiry” of “Basic’s ‘total
mix’ standard.” Id. at 1321–22.
Besides rejecting the bright-line rule proposed by the defendants, and adhering to the
Basic test for materiality, it is unclear as to what else was resolved in Matrixx. Namely, did
the Court determine that the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed past the motion to dismiss
case, or did the Court decide—as a matter of law—that the materiality element was satis-
fied, assuming that the plaintiff could prove the facts alleged in the complaint?  The
Court’s decision says both. Compare id. at 1322 (“[W]e conclude that respondents have
adequately pleaded materiality.”), and id. at 1323 (“We believe that these allegations suf-
fice to ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ satisfying the
materiality requirement.” (quoting Twombly)), with id. at 1323 (“Assuming [the facts al-
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leged in the complaint] to be true, these were material facts ‘necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.’” (quoting Rule 10b-5(b)). The issue was never resolved in the Matrixx litiga-
tion, as the case settled after the Supreme Court’s decision. Communications with one of
the plaintiffs’ attorneys in Matrixx revealed that the plaintiffs viewed the Supreme Court’s
decision as a complete, final victory on the materiality question; according to the plaintiffs,
they had won the materiality issue at the Supreme Court level. Compare this reading of
Matrixx to the view that the plaintiffs had simply cleared a preliminary hurdle by winning
in the Supreme Court with an ultimate decision to be made after further litigation. I as-
sume that this is how the defendants, on remand in Matrixx, would have characterized the
Supreme Court’s decision, although my attempts to communicate with the defendants’ at-
torneys, in order to get their perspective on what was resolved in the Matrixx opinion, were
unsuccessful.
These ambiguities regarding the Matrixx opinion make it virtually impossible to draw
any conclusions from that decision regarding the nature of the plausibility test. More fun-
damentally, questions regarding the nature of the materiality inquiry itself add to the diffi-
culty because it is not entirely clear whether the dispositive analysis under the materiality
question should be determined by the judge or the jury. Previously in this footnote, I made
the obvious observation that whether a misrepresentation is “material” involves a legal
determination rather than a conclusion on a material fact. This obvious statement, how-
ever, does not preclude the possibility that a jury would be asked to resolve this legal
question. There are a variety of legal rules, whose application depends on fact-specific
context, that are given to the jury to resolve. Thus, the materiality question might be for
either the judge or the jury, depending on the legal definition for materiality.
Under the “objective” standard for determining materiality, first articulated in
Northway, the question is whether the misrepresentation would matter to the “reasonable”
recipient of that information. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
Framing the materiality inquiry in terms of how a “reasonable” person would be affected
by the faulty information obviously provokes an analogy to the “reasonable person” test
under tort law for determining negligence and suggests that the application of this legal
rule should be decided by a jury. Not surprisingly, then, in Northway, the Court drew this
precise comparison in describing the materiality question as a “mixed question of law and
fact” but also stating that—similar to the negligence issue within tort law—this inquiry is
“peculiarly one[ ] for the trier of fact” unless the correct decision is “obvious[ ].” Id. at 450
& n.12. Other courts have viewed materiality as a question for the jury. See, e.g., S.E.C. v.
Conaway, 698 F. Supp. 2d 771, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (discussing the materiality jury
charge for a §10(b) claim).
The problem with defining the materiality element with primary reference to the reason-
able person standard in tort law is that the jury is serving a normative function in the torts
context. The jury is not simply to determine what the average person would do, but rather
what the average person should do. For instance, a defendant’s compliance with industry
custom is evidence of reasonableness but is not determinative. See The T.J. Hooper, 53
F.2d 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (Hand, J.) (finding that compliance with industry custom
was evidence of the defendant’s reasonableness but not conclusive on the matter). Simi-
larly, a defendant’s failure to comply with industry custom is evidence of a breach but is
not determinative. See Gideon Parchomovksy & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107
MICH. L. REV. 285, 291–92 (2008) (stating that a defendant’s failure to comply with indus-
try custom is evidence of negligence but that the defendant can introduce contradictory
evidence and thus create a jury issue). With regard to materiality, however, the Court does
not seem to contemplate that this “objective” analysis will require a normative judgment.
Rather, the Court seems to envision a determination about how the average person would
react, rather than should react, to the misrepresentation of the defendant.
If the materiality test is a question of how most/many/some investors would react to the
defendant’s misrepresentation, there is a clearer way to ask that question: did the misrep-
resentation affect the market price for this security? After all, the market price for a partic-
ular security reflects the myriad views of real people regarding value. Under this
articulation of the materiality analysis, the focus of the inquiry has changed to a causation
inquiry (specifically, a cause-in-fact inquiry) from the previous “reasonableness” inquiry.
And, indeed, it seems as if the Court is beginning to make this transition in Matrixx; the
Matrixx opinion frequently employs the term “causation” in analyzing the materiality
question. See generally Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. 1309.
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The Court’s other citations to Twombly are, like the Matrixx decision,
unhelpful in determining whether plausibility means probability or confi-
The determination of cause-in-fact is, like the question of “reasonableness,” usually sub-
mitted to the jury. Of course, the jury’s determination of cause in fact is different than the
jury’s determination of an historical fact; an historical fact requires a jury to determine
what did happen, while cause-in-fact requires a jury to determine what would have hap-
pened if the defendant had complied with the law. See David W. Robertson, The Common
Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997) (explaining the counterfactual
nature of a cause-in-fact inquiry). Nevertheless, the jury is usually thought to be at an
advantage (compared to the judge) in resolving this counterfactual determination, and thus
causation is usually submitted to the jury. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand
the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1249 (2011) (explaining that
cause in fact is usually considered a jury question).
Thus, one can make an argument that Matrixx—like Twombly and Iqbal—employed the
plausibility test to a specific question that would ultimately be submitted to the jury. Under
this view, the ultimate question the Matrixx Court was resolving was the potential that the
defendant’s misrepresentations affected the market price of the defendant’s stock. The
plaintiffs’ complaint was analyzed as to whether the circumstantial evidence alleged in the
complaint satisfied the “plausibility” requirement such that the plaintiff could proceed in
the litigation. Under this reading of Matrixx, the Court resolved this question (unlike in
Twombly and Iqbal) in favor of the plaintiff, meaning that the litigation could advance past
the 12(b)(6) stage.
Under this interpretation, however, it still is not clear whether the plausibility analysis is
being employed as a term of probability and confidence. Did the Court believe that the
allegations in the complaint made it probable that the market price was affected by the
misinformation, or did the Court simply conclude that the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient
amount of information such that the jury should be allowed to make a probability determi-
nation or that, at least, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to discovery?  The Ma-
trixx opinion does little to resolve this question.
It is not clear, however, that the jury question/plausibility reading of Matrixx is accurate.
At the end of the Court’s decision in Matrixx, the Court’s couches its ultimate conclusion
on the “materiality” question in a manner that suggests that the issue has been affirma-
tively resolved—as a matter of law—in favor of the plaintiff. If this is what was determined
in Matrixx, this conclusion seems incompatible with the view that Matrixx involved—like
Twombly and Iqbal—an application of the plausibility analysis. In Twombly and Iqbal, the
Court applied plausibility to a question that would ultimately be resolved by the jury, find-
ing the plaintiffs’ allegations insufficient to allow the cases to proceed. There was no sug-
gestion in either Twombly or Iqbal, however, that a conclusion in favor of plausibility
would conclusively resolve—as a matter of law—the factual issue for the plaintiff. Or, at
least, this would be a dramatic upheaval in the manner in which the plausibility test has
been understood. The common view of plausibility (as applied to a plaintiff’s complaint) is
that the analysis can end the litigation in a manner that is favorable to the defendant but
not in a manner that is favorable to the plaintiff; plausibility, then, is a one-way street. It
would be odd for the Court to alter the common perception of plausibility as an analysis
that can only help defendants to an analysis that can be employed by either party without
more attention to the issue. And, of course, the “plausibility” term itself seems inconsistent
with this usage:  it makes sense to say that a defendant should win the case if the plaintiff’s
complaint is not plausible, but it makes little sense to say that a plaintiff should win a case
if her complaint is plausible.
Thus, if the Supreme Court in Matrixx resolved the materiality question as a matter of
law, in favor of the plaintiff (and remember that this is how the plaintiffs’ lawyers viewed
the decision), this result would seem to be most consistent with the view that materiality is
a question that should be decided by a judge rather than submitted to a jury. Under this
view of the Matrixx decision, the Court’s analysis is completely irrelevant to attempting to
understand the plausibility test because the Court was concerned with a matter that
needed to be resolved by the judge rather than the jury.
In conclusion, I do not have any clear answers when it comes to attempting to discern
what Matrixx means with regard to Twombly’s plausibility analysis. The following, how-
ever, seems valid: anyone citing Matrixx as clear support for any conclusion regarding the
plausibility analysis has not, in my opinion, appreciated the complexity of the case.
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dence.218 A consideration of the Court’s other cases that make extensive
use of the term “plausibility,” however, does offer some clues as to
whether the Court intended plausibility to involve a confidence or
probability analysis.
The Court has historically employed the term “plausible” or “plausibil-
ity” with surprising frequency.219 The two opinions (other than Twombly
218. In Pitre v. Cain, Justice Sotomayor cited Twombly in her dissenting opinion from
the Court’s denial of certiorari. See Pitre v. Cain, 131 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari). Justice Sotomayor cited Twombly for the
proposition that “[w]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed
based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support
for his allegations.” Id.  This statement is somewhat circular because it assumes the very
question that Twombly addresses: whether a claim adequately states a claim. Moreover,
the fundamental question in Pitre was whether the plaintiff’s complaint had “state[d] an
Eighth Amendment violation,” and thus did not involve the questions of historical fact to
which the plausibility analysis was applied in Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 8. In Pacific Bell
Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., the Court cited Twombly only as part of
the Court’s instructions on remand to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff’s
complaint had stated a claim under Rule 8. See 555 U.S. 438, 456 (2009). In his Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing concurrence, Justice Stevens cited his Twombly
dissent. See 551 U.S. 264, 287 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens compared
the result in Credit Suisse, in which the Court determined—as a matter of law—that securi-
ties law precluded an antitrust claim against underwriting firms that market and distribute
newly issued securities, with the result in Twombly, which (according to his dissenting
opinion) required “discovery to determine whether there is any merit to the plaintiffs’
claims.” Id. Finally, in the much discussed case of Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007),
the Court cited Twombly in reversing the dismissal of a prisoner’s pro se complaint. Id. at
93. The Court referenced Twombly as preserving the notice pleading approach of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. at 93–94, but also noted that a pro se complaint
should be judged differently than a complaint drafted by a lawyer. See id. at 94. Like many
others, I am not sure what to make of Erickson, except to say that the per curiam opinion
offers little guidance on the nature of the plausibility analysis. See, e.g., Allen & Guy, supra
note 124, at 2 (describing the Erickson case as a “puzzle”); Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009) (stat-
ing that Erickson “confuse[d] matters even further”).
219. The Court has used the term “plausibility” in 242 opinions, starting with the
Court’s opinion in Silsby v. Young, 7 U.S. 249, 261 (1806). The term “plausible” shows up
in 1106 opinions, the first of which was Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 54, 86 (1795). A scan of these cases indicates that the plausibility term is sometimes
employed as a term of probability. See, e.g., Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 28 (2011);
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 737 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402 (2007) (all
using “plausibility” to discuss the probability of a party’s factual contentions); Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 217 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elec-
tion Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 235 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (both of which employ the term
“plausible” to discuss the probability of the proffered factual justifications for a particular
statute). In other instances, the term “plausible” is used to describe the likely intent moti-
vating a particular statement, and in this sense is being used as a term of probability. See,
e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 (2010) (using the term “plausible” to describe the
likely intent behind a juror’s statement); F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012);
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S.
527, 551 n.6 (2008); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 394 (2008) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (all using the term “plausible” or “plausibility” to discuss Congress’s likely intent
behind statute). In other instances, however, the Court uses “plausible” or “plausibility” in
a manner that does not denote a probability analysis. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2656 (2012); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011)
(both of which use the term “plausibility” to discuss the persuasiveness of a party’s legal
argument).
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and Iqbal) in which the Court used the term most prevalently (and in a
context that is potentially helpful to figuring out what the Twombly Court
intended) were Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.220 and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.221 In Matsushita,
the Court used “plausibility” to indicate a confidence analysis while in
Tellabs the Court employed the term as part of a probability analysis.222
In Matsushita, the Court affirmed a summary judgment for the defend-
ants in an antitrust case based on the conclusion that the summary judg-
ment record in that case rendered the plaintiffs’ allegation of conspiracy
“implausible.”223 As I have explained at length elsewhere, the Court’s use
of “plausibility” in Matsushita represented a confidence, rather than a
probability, analysis.224 The reason that the plaintiffs lost at summary
judgment in Matsushita was not that the Court necessarily doubted the
probability of the antitrust conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs, but rather
that there was so little evidence on this question that little confidence
could be had in any probability conclusion drawn from the scant re-
cord.225 In Matsushita, the plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the alleged con-
spiracy consisted primarily of the parallel business activity of the
defendants.226 The Court concluded—similar to Professor Tribe’s blue
bus hypothetical discussed earlier in this paper227—that this was simply
not a sufficient amount of evidence from which to permit a probability
decision to be made by the jury.228
The use of “plausibility” as a term of confidence in Matsushita, how-
ever, should be contrasted with how that term was employed in Tellabs.
The term “plausible” is sprinkled throughout the Tellabs opinion to de-
scribe the pleading analysis required under the PSLRA.229 And, as dis-
cussed previously, there is no question that this analysis is a probability
analysis.230
Thus, at first blush, Matsushita and Tellabs seem to point in different
directions regarding Twombly’s use of the term “plausibility.” On one
hand, Matsushita involved almost the exact same antitrust issues as did
Twombly, so it stands to reason that the Court’s use of “plausibility” in
Twombly represented the same analysis as that involved in Matsushita.231
220. See generally Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
221. See generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
222. See Meier, supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also supra note 57 and accom-
panying text.
223. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
224. See Meier, supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining why Matsushita
should be understood as being resolved according to a confidence analysis).
225. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
226. Id. at 579.
227. See supra text accompanying note 73.
228. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
229. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313, 317, 323 (2007).
230. See supra note 117.
231. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585–86 (2007).
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On the other hand, Tellabs was decided only months after Twombly,232
so it is logical that the Court would intend to use the term consistently in
these nearly contemporaneous decisions. Moreover, Tellabs, like
Twombly, is a pleadings case, while Matsushita is a summary judgment
case.233 Thus, if one considers the procedure involved, Tellabs, use of the
term “plausibility” would suggest the same usage was meant in Twombly.
Upon further consideration, however, there are compelling reasons to
believe that the Twombly Court thought it was using the Matsushita ver-
sion of “plausibility” (confidence) rather than the Tellabs version
(probability). The Matsushita decision is cited by the Twombly Court as
authority for the plausibility standard.234 Granted, the Court could not
have cited the Tellabs decision in Twombly because the Tellabs opinion
had not been issued when Twombly was handed down.235 That said, the
Twombly decision was not cited within the Tellabs opinion.236 This is sig-
nificant when one considers the issue that the Court was wrestling with in
Tellabs. In Tellabs, the Court was interpreting the pleading requirements
of the PSLRA.237 As discussed above, the Court assumed that the
PSLRA imposed a probability requirement at the pleadings stage; the
question in Tellabs was the measure of probability that a judge would
apply at the pleadings stage.238 If Twombly truly imposed a probability
requirement at the pleadings stage, it is difficult to discern why the Court
would not reference this standard as a benchmark in trying to fix the
standard required under the PSLRA.239 Numerous commentators have
232. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 308 (indicating that Tellabs was decided on June 21, 2007);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (indicating that Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007).
233. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313–14; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–49; Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 576.
234. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 560, 561 n.7 (citing Matsushita).
235. See supra note 232.
236. See generally Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.
237. See id. at 313–14.
238. See id. at 314.
239. It is also somewhat difficult to determine why the PSLRA is necessary if
Twombly’s plausibility analysis also requires a probability analysis. One theory is that the
PSLRA requires a probability analysis in a particular type of case that would not be sub-
ject to a probability analysis under Twombly. As I have previously explained, I believe that
Twombly’s plausibility analysis is only triggered by a complaint that fails the factual speci-
ficity requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the PSLRA, a
judge considers the probability that the defendant acted with scienter. See id. at 313–14. I
do not believe this is the type of complaint that would be subject to Twombly’s plausibility
analysis because it is impossible to describe a defendant’s scienter with factual specificity.
Scienter is a fact, but it is not a real world event that can be described with any more
specificity than the simple allegation that the “defendant acted with scienter.”
Another theory is that the PSLRA is necessary because it requires a higher standard of
probability than that required under Twombly. A few commentators have advanced this
theory. See, e.g., Jason Bartlett, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-Defeating Effects of
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 87 & n.97, 88 & n.98
(2009) (analyzing both Twombly and Tellabs in terms of probability but concluding that
the Tellabs standard must be slightly more demanding than the Twombly standard).
There is also a practical explanation as to why Congress would enact a probability re-
quirement within the PSLRA even though a probability requirement is imposed under the
generic pleading rules: Congress was not aware, when it passed the PSLRA in 1995, that
the Federal Rules required a probability analysis because the Court did not invent this
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assumed that both Twombly and Tellabs impose the same general plead-
ing standard,240 but the failure of the Court to acknowledge this similarity
undermines the notion that the two cases involve the same probability
analysis.
That the Twombly Court meant Matsushita plausibility rather than Tel-
labs plausibility is further strengthened when one considers Iqbal. De-
spite this ambiguity regarding Iqbal’s application of the plausibility
standard, it is significant that the opinion fails to cite Tellabs.241 Iqbal
cites Twombly, and Twombly only, on this point.242 Thus, looking collec-
tively at the four Supreme Court cases (Matsushita, Twombly, Tellabs,
and Iqbal) in which “plausibility” is most prevalently used, a pattern
emerges. Tellabs uses the term “plausibility” as a term of probability.243
But, Tellabs does not cite, nor is it cited by, the other three cases.244 On
the other hand, Iqbal relies on and cites Twombly.245 Twombly relies on
and cites Matsushita, and Matsushita uses “plausibility” to refer to a con-
fidence analysis.246 In this group of four “plausibility” cases, Matsushita,
Twombly, and Iqbal are connected even though they involve different
litigation stages (pleading and summary judgment) and different types of
disputes (antitrust and discrimination). Tellabs stands alone. In trying to
determine whether Twombly’s (and, for that matter, Iqbal’s) use of
“plausibility” meant probability or confidence, the fact that Twombly is
linked to Matsushita and not Tellabs is telling.
requirement until 2007, in Twombly. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2012) (amend Dec. 22, 1995). Numerous commentators have advanced the argument that
Twombly changed the rules of pleading in a way that was inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court holdings. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at 15–16. Although I have argued that
Twombly can be completely reconciled with preexisting Supreme Court precedent (includ-
ing Conley v. Gibson) regarding the introduction of the plausibility standard, I also believe
it is fair to conclude that Congress could not have anticipated the plausibility standard as
an element of Rule 8. See Meier, supra note 5, at 732–33. It stands to reason, then, that if
Congress could not have anticipated the standard, it would also not have anticipated that
this standard would be interpreted as a probability requirement. Thus, if Twombly is inter-
preted as a probability requirement, Congress would probably not have recognized this
when it passed the PSLRA.
240. See Burbank, supra note 117, at 551–52 (discussing the Twombly and Tellabs
pleading standards as if both involve the same general type of inquiry and considering the
“ridiculous” notion that Twombly’s standard “is more demanding than the standard under
the PSLRA”); Nathan Paulich, Pleading Scienter: How Tellabs Changed Securities Class
Action Litigation, 9 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 127, 140 (2010) (recognizing the view that Tel-
labs essentially replicates the analysis from Twombly); Steinberg & Gomez-Cornejo, supra
note 8, at 32 (discussing the “convergence of pleading standards” between Twombly and
the PSLRA); Honorable Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:
Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 851, 864–65 (2008) (“[T]here is no reason to think that ‘plausible’ means anything
different in Twombly than it does in Tellabs.”).
241. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
242. See id. 669–70.
243. See supra note 117.
244. See generally Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.
245. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669–70.
246. See supra notes 14 & 234 and accompanying text.
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C. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Perhaps the most compelling reason to interpret Twombly’s plausibility
analysis as a confidence analysis is that a confidence analysis does not
encroach, or even threaten, the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.247 The core of the Seventh Amendment is the jury’s right to
decide disputed questions of fact: “[t]he limitation imposed by the
amendment is merely that . . . the ultimate determination of issues of fact
by the jury be not interfered with.”248 Under a confidence analysis, the
jury’s territory is preserved because, under a confidence analysis, a judge
does not make any determination regarding the existence or non-exis-
tence of the facts in dispute.249 Instead, a judge makes a decision about
whether the evidence is adequate so as to allow a jury to make a deci-
sion.250 Importantly, the judge’s decision as to whether to allow the case
to proceed is not based on the judge’s own views of the probative value of
the record evidence.251 Instead, the judge’s decision under a confidence
analysis is based on the quantity of the evidence that is available.252
In this sense, then, a confidence analysis is analytically similar to other
procedural decisions by a judge that do not violate the Seventh Amend-
ment. For instance, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
judge has to determine whether relevant evidence must be excluded be-
cause “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presentating of cumulative evidence.”253 The
application of this rule requires a trial court judge to make decisions
about the usefulness of particular pieces of evidence to the jury’s deci-
sion-making process.254 This managerial power, however, is not usually
considered a violation of the Seventh Amendment255 because the “ulti-
247. See U.S. CONST. amend VII.
248. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
249. See Meier supra note 11, at 17–18.
250. See id. at 17.
251. See id. at 17–18.
252. See id.
253. FED. R. EVID. 403.
254. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 778 (1998) (discuss-
ing how Rule 403 requires trial judges to determine the usefulness of relevant evidence to
the jury).
255. But see Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional,
and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2013) (arguing that Rule 403
violates the Seventh Amendment because juries, not judges, “decide what weight to give
[to] evidence”). Although Professor Klein’s arguments are well presented, I believe that he
has erred in describing the gist of the Seventh Amendment as the jury’s right to weigh
evidence. Rather, as the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he limitation imposed by the
amendment is merely that . . . the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not
interfered with.” In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310. This distinction is subtle but important.
Saying that a jury is protected as the ultimate decision-maker is not the same as saying that
the judge has no input as to the information from which the jury must decide. To be sure, a
jury must weigh the evidence in order to reach an ultimate conclusion, but it does not
follow that a judge is precluded from engaging in the type of “weighing” required by Rule
403. A judge “weighing” evidence under Rule 403 is managing a trial but is not making the
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mate determination of issues of fact”256 is still left to the jury.
An analogy illustrates the point. The task of a jury can be compared to
a computer program that is designed to analyze data to reach a conclu-
sion about the likelihood of a particular event occurring. Consider a com-
puter program that is designed to determine the likelihood of rain at a
certain time and date; the computer has a complicated matrix under
which it analyzes the raw data entered into the computer (temperature,
barometric pressure, wind, air fronts, humidity, etc.) to determine the
likelihood of rain. The computer program’s function is purely a
probability analysis and in this way can be compared to the duty of a jury
to determine the likelihood of particular events. Notice, however, that the
computer program requires the input of raw data, and this in turn re-
quires a decision as to what data to feed into the computer. The meteor-
ologist relying on the computer’s number-crunching ability might decide
to refrain from inputting some data because of the time and expense as-
sociated with gathering this data, despite the reality that this data would
slightly improve the computer’s accuracy. So, for instance, a meteorolo-
gist might decide to avoid gathering the water temperature of a distant
ocean or lake, even though this data would improve the accuracy of the
weather prediction generated by the computer program. Along these
same lines, a judge might decide (under Rule 403) to exclude some evi-
dence from the jury as part of the judge’s discretion about the cost and
benefits of gathering and presenting this evidence. Notice, however, that
the “ultimate determination” regarding the probability question is pre-
served for the jury (or the computer): the judge (or meteorologist) must
decide what information to present the “fact-finder,” but it is the jury (or
the computer) that is left to weigh the evidence and make a probability
conclusion.
Whereas a judge’s evidentiary analysis can be compared to the task of
deciding what input to feed into the computer, a confidence analysis is
akin to a decision that there is so little information to feed to the com-
puter that the program will not be run. Suppose a situation in which many
of the meteorologist’s tools for gathering raw data have broken. Thus, the
only information that is available to feed into the computer is the air
temperature and wind speed. The computer can perform a probability
analysis based only on this limited data, but there will be little confidence
in whatever prediction is given by the computer. Under this scenario,
rather than allowing the computer to generate a prediction based on this
scant information, the meteorologists might decide to forego the process
and pull the plug on the computer. This decision is made not because the
meteorologist necessarily thinks that the prediction made by the com-
puter would be wrong—the meteorologist recognizes that the computer is
adept at performing this probability calculation—but because the limited
“ultimate determination of issues of fact,” which is preserved for the jury by the Seventh
Amendment.
256. Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310.
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quantity of information means that there can be little confidence in the
ultimate prediction. The problem is not the matrix by which the computer
offers a prediction, but rather the limited information that is available to
input into the calculation. Similarly, a judge who decides a case through a
confidence analysis does not preempt the jury’s probability analysis, but
rather makes a conclusion regarding the adequacy of the information
from which the jury would be expected to assess probability. The judge,
figuratively speaking, pulls the plug on the jury, but not because the judge
distrusts the jury’s ability to assess probability.
While a confidence analysis preserves for the jury “the ultimate deter-
mination of issues of fact,”257 a probability analysis does not. When a
judge resolves a case pursuant to a probability analysis, the judge has
substituted her probability analysis for that of the jury. To continue with
the analogy made above, a judge employing a probability analysis is akin
to the meteorologist independently analyzing the data and concluding
that the computer could not possibly predict rain for tomorrow. When a
judge resolves a case pursuant to a probability analysis, the judge
preempts the jury’s constitutional role as the ultimate arbiter of the
probability of disputed facts.258
The well-recognized principle that ambiguous language should not be
interpreted in a manner that implicates constitutional questions works in
favor of the confidence interpretation of Twombly’s plausibility stan-
dard.259 Conversely, the serious constitutional questions that arise under
a probability interpretation of plausibility undermine the probability per-
spective of Twombly.260
D. THE POLICY BEHIND TWOMBLY AND THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE
NATURE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Earlier, the Twombly decision was analyzed in terms of what the Court
said about the plausibility analysis it was applying.261 The results of that
inquiry were not particularly fruitful in attempting to determine whether
plausibility means probability or confidence. A broader perspective on
the nature of the problem the Twombly Court was concerned with, how-
ever, confirms that the Court was using plausibility as a term of confi-
dence rather than probability.
The first problem that seems to be driving the Court in Twombly is the
notion that a “false positive[ ]” result in antitrust law can be particularly
257. Id.
258. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005–06
(2010) (noting the potential constitutional problems with interpreting Twombly as requir-
ing a probability analysis).
259. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
260. That these constitutional concerns were discounted in Tellabs is not determinative.
As explained previously, the Court’s analysis in Tellabs is neither thorough nor compelling.
Hopefully, the Court will soon reconsider the shoddy analysis and reasoning in Tellabs
regarding the scope of the Seventh Amendment.
261. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.
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harmful.262 A false positive occurs when a defendant is incorrectly deter-
mined to have committed illegal conduct.263 The problem is thought to be
particularly acute in antitrust law.264 A defendant’s aggressive, capitalist
behavior is desirable from a market standpoint if that behavior is the re-
sult of the defendant’s sole conduct.265 If, however, a defendant’s behav-
ior is the result of an agreement or conspiracy with other market
participants, that behavior constitutes a violation of antitrust law.266 Thus,
the same behavior might be either desirable or illegal depending on
whether it is the result of anticompetitive agreement.267 Obviously, then,
the likelihood—and consequences—of a false positive result are more
dramatic within antitrust law than in other contexts: a false positive in the
antitrust context means that a defendant is punished for conduct that is
not merely legal but also desirable. In Twombly, the Court specifically
references the problem of an antitrust “false positive.”268
The other concern driving the Court’s decision in Twombly is the ex-
pansive, and expensive, nature of discovery in antitrust cases.269 The
plaintiff’s ability to subject a defendant to massive discovery means that
there is an in terrorem settlement value to the case simply because of the
potential expenses to the defendant that can eliminated by a quick settle-
ment.270 The Court viewed its decision in Twombly as addressing this
question and explicitly ruled out the notion that this problem could be
resolved by “judicial supervision” of the discovery process.271
Both of the issues identified by the Court in Twombly are problems
from the perspective of the defendant rather than the plaintiff. And each
of these problems is remediated by the imposition of either a probability
262. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
263. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of
False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1, 22 (2010) (explaining the concept
of false positive errors, including settlements in which the defendant pays money to the
plaintiff even though no illegal conduct occurred).
264. See id. at 22 (discussing the false positive problem in the context of antitrust law).
265. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (explaining that the Sherman Act’s
“purpose was to suppress combinations” because they “restrain competition”).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
267. See Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Con-
spiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 651 (2008) (“The challenge is to distin-
guish those claims that are inappropriate sanctions for pro-competitive conduct—the false
positives—from those that appropriately act as disincentives to harmful conduct. Courts
and commentators understand that the height of competitive activity may look very much
like conduct that violates Sherman One.”).
268. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (citing the AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating
Fact from Fantasy, Related Publication 06-08, pp. 3–4 (2006)). The Twombly Court also
references the Court’s previous decision in Matsushita. See id. at 554, 560, 561 n.7 (where
the Court’s “false positive” concern compelled the Court to conclude that the plaintiff had
not satisfied the summary judgment confidence inquiry); see also Meier, supra note 12, at
751.
269. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“[P]roceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive.”).
270. See id. (discussing the in terrorem settlement value to a case once it moves beyond
the pleadings stage); see also Anderson & Huffman, supra note 263, at 20–21 (same).
271. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
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or confidence analysis at the pleadings stage. The imposition of a
probability analysis at the pleadings stage imposes an additional fact-
finder that the plaintiff must convince in order to win the litigation. Be-
cause the plausibility analysis works against—and not for—the plain-
tiff,272 a probability analysis means that this inquiry is an “all risk, no
reward” proposition for the plaintiff. Requiring the plaintiff to convince
this additional fact-finder of the probability of the facts alleged in the
complaint (regardless of what particular standard of persuasion the judge
is applying) would serve to cut down on both the “false positive” and in
terrorem discovery abuse concerns identified by the Court in Twombly.
Indeed, simply dismissing all antitrust complaints at the outset of litiga-
tion would completely eliminate all false positive results and all in ter-
rorem settlements.273 Requiring a judge to perform probability at the
outset of the litigation increases the likelihood of this type of dismissal
and thus addresses the dual concerns driving the Court’s decision in
Twombly.
A confidence analysis also addresses the concerns identified by the
Twombly Court. Requiring a plaintiff to come forward with additional
information before he is allowed to proceed in the litigation means that
the cases that are allowed to proceed might tend to be the cases in which
the need for massive discovery is not as great. The more information a
plaintiff has at the outset of litigation, the less need for discovery; con-
versely, a plaintiff with relatively little information at the outset of the
case will have the greatest need for discovery. In addition, any analysis
that increases the likelihood of a dismissal on the pleadings means that
the potential for a false positive diminishes, assuming that at least some of
the cases being dismissed are cases in which the plaintiff’s factual asser-
tions are incorrect. Requiring a confidence analysis at the pleadings stage,
then, would address both of the concerns raised by the Court in
Twombly.
Thus, simply identifying the policy concerns of the Court in Twombly
does little to distinguish whether plausibility means confidence or
probability because either analysis would help alleviate the Court’s de-
fendant-centric concerns. That said, attempting to fix these concerns
272. Some have suggested that the plausibility analysis can work for a plaintiff when the
standard is applied to a defendant’s pleading assertions. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Plausi-
bility Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 991–92 (2012) (arguing that the
plausibility analysis should be applied to affirmative defenses raised by the defendant).
Thus, it might be more accurate to say that a plausibility standard works against the party
whose pleadings are being measured under the standard. A plaintiff cannot win a case by
showing that her complaint is plausible; she just avoids losing the case. Similarly, a defen-
dant does not win a case by showing that his affirmative defense is plausible; he just avoids
this defense being excluded.
273. Of course, while dismissing all suits would eliminate any false positives, it would
increase the amount of false negatives, situations in which a defendant avoids liability even
though the defendant committed a violation. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right:
Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51
(1996) (“Eliminating or reducing false positives is a reasonable goal as long as the result in
not a shift in the relative proportions of false positives to false negatives.”).
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through a probability analysis results in analytical problems that do not
arise if plausibility instead requires a confidence analysis.
First, of course, is the Seventh Amendment issue, discussed above. A
probability analysis is difficult to reconcile with the Seventh Amendment,
while a confidence analysis does not raise this same policy concern. Addi-
tionally, however, a confidence analysis does a better job of squaring the
antitrust-specific concerns of the Twombly Court with the transsubstan-
tive nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.274
Both the false positive and in terrorem settlement issues are concerns
that are unique to, or at least are more acute within, antitrust law. To
address this problem through the application of a probability analysis
seems to run afoul of the notion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Federal Rules)  require the same approach regardless of the substantive
nature of the case at bar. Whether a judge employs a probability analysis
at the pleadings stage would seem to be an issue on which the Federal
Rules would give a uniform answer. The ultimate question under a
probability analysis is whether a fact exists. This same question arises,
uniformly, in all different types of litigation.
If plausibility requires a confidence analysis, however, the very nature
of the analysis permits a consideration of the underlying policies of a par-
ticular case while nevertheless preserving the transsubstantive nature of
the Federal Rules. Recall that a confidence analysis requires a determina-
tion as to whether there is a sufficient amount of information available
for the task at hand. This analysis necessarily involves a consideration of
context or policy. Thus, to go back to the Royals hypothetical discussed
previously, George might decide that he does have a sufficient amount of
information if we slightly change the facts of the hypothetical. If George
were asked to wager $1—as opposed to $10—he might decide that the
information he possesses is a sufficient basis on which to place a wager.
A confidence analysis at the pleading stage, then, would quite naturally
consider the antitrust-specific concerns that the Court discussed in the
Twombly opinion.275 As alluded to earlier in this Article, a pleadings con-
fidence analysis could take two forms. The Court could ask whether the
plaintiff has a sufficient amount of information such that the plaintiff
could survive a confidence inquiry at the summary judgment stage. The
Twombly Court, by discussing the “false positive” concern and citing
Matsushita276—which employed a confidence analysis to affirm a sum-
mary judgment277—supports this version of the pleadings confidence
analysis. Alternatively, a pleadings confidence analysis could ask whether
a plaintiff has a sufficient amount of evidence so as to be entitled to pro-
ceed to discovery. This approach would distinguish the pleadings confi-
274. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New-
Old Procedure as a Possible Antitdote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57,
82 (1994) (discussing transsubstantive model of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
275. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
276. See id.
277. See Meier, supra note 11, at 137.
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dence analysis from the summary judgment confidence analysis and leave
room for the notion that a plaintiff should be allowed to use the formal
discovery process to gather necessary information that the plaintiff did
not have at the outset of the lawsuit. The Twombly Court’s discussion of
the need for a “reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will
reveal relevant evidence”278 supports this version of the pleadings confi-
dence analysis.
Under either version of this pleadings confidence analysis, however, a
consideration of context—including the subject matter involved in the
suit—would be warranted. And, importantly, this context-specific analy-
sis would not violate the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules.
The confidence requirement would apply across-the-board, consistent
with the transsubstantive principles of the Federal Rules. The application
of this principle, however, would necessarily consider context, including
the legal subject matter of the dispute. That transsubstantive rules might
apply differently to different types of cases is not an unusual result. In-
deed, under Rule 8, a court has to determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged a violation of the law.279 The existence of this requirement is
transsubstantive, but there is no way that a judge could apply this
transsubstantive requirement except by considering the particular context
and subject matter of the dispute.
The distinction between the existence of transsubstantive rules and
context-specific applications explains why the Iqbal Court rejected the
notion that Twombly’s pleading standard should be limited only to anti-
trust cases.280 The Iqbal court made clear that the plausibility standard
that was articulated in Twombly was a product of Rule 8, which applies to
“all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”281
That said, the Court in both Twombly and Iqbal also made clear that the
antitrust and qualified immunity contexts of those cases were impor-
tant.282 The distinction between the existence of a transsubstantive rule
and context-specific application of that rule explains these seemingly con-
tradictory statements.
Distinguishing between the existence of a transsubstantive rule and the
context-specific application of the rule does not work as well, however, if
plausibility means probability. It is somewhat difficult to conceive of a
278. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559–60 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
347 (2005)).
279. See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY, & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 60 (2004) (explaining the need for a judge to determine the legal merits of the plain-
tiff’s complaint as a “substantive sufficiency” challenge).
280. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
281. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
282. See id. at 675 (“In Twombly, the Court found it necessary first to discuss the anti-
trust principles implicated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note of the ele-
ments a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against
officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.”) (internal citation omitted);
see also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 137 (2010) (stating
that Iqbal was “plainly [ ] motivated by concerns originating in the law of official
immunity”).
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probability standard that morphs depending on the context of the dis-
pute.283 If Twombly requires probability, the seeming import of the anti-
trust and qualified immunity contexts in Twombly and Iqbal would
apparently require a court’s benchmark for determining probability to
rise. Thus, for instance, a judge could apply a 40% probability standard in
an antitrust or qualified immunity case but only a 15% standard in a typi-
cal case in which there are not the same false positive and in terrorem
concerns. Nothing about the nature of a probability inquiry, however,
would seem to permit a court to massage the standard based on these
context-specific concerns. A probability analysis is about the ultimate ex-
istence of facts. The likelihood of a material fact does not depend on
context or policy. As such, manipulating these standards based on policy
concerns seems to run afoul of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal
Rules. To require a judge to employ a higher burden of persuasion is not
simply an instance in which the rule applies differently depending upon
context. Requiring a higher standard of probability for particular types of
cases (such as antitrust and qualified immunity) is to apply a completely
different rule.284 This violates the transsubstantive principles within the
Federal Rules.
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW A CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS
COMPLEMENTS RULE 8’S FACTUAL
SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT
As discussed above, an interpretation of Twombly’s plausibility stan-
dard as involving a confidence analysis is thus superior—on multiple
levels—to a probability interpretation of the standard. A final argument
in favor of a confidence reading of Twombly’s plausibility standard, ad-
vanced in this section, is that this reading of the standard facilitates a
cohesive and sensible understanding of the entire pre-trial process. In
particular, interpreting Twombly’s plausibility standard to require a con-
fidence analysis aligns plausibility with the traditional requirement that a
complaint include a certain level of factual specificity in order to avoid
dismissal. The factual specificity requirement, properly understood, is a
form of confidence analysis and serves as a trigger for the plausibility test;
283. Professor Kaplow has suggested an interpretation of the plausibility standard that
allows a judge to apply a different standard of probability based on the type of suit in-
volved and relevant policy considerations regarding allowing the case to proceed. See gen-
erally Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1252–83. I believe that the thesis advanced in this Article
originates from roughly the same perspective as that of Professor Kaplow. That said, his
sliding-scale probability interpretation of plausibility does not account for the transsub-
stantive nature of the Federal Rules. See id. Moreover, Professor Kaplow does not consider
how his proposed understanding of Twombly fares under the Seventh Amendment. See id.
at n.177 (admitting that he has pushed the constitutional issues “to the side”). In my opin-
ion, these issues simply cannot be ignored in attempting to construct a doctrinal basis for
the plausibility analysis.
284. The PSLRA demonstrates this concept. The probability analysis of the PSLRA
violates the transsubstantive principles of the Federal Rules but it does so through the
adoption of a different rule. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
313 (2007) (explaining the special requirements of the PSLRA).
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it only makes sense that the plausibility test would require the same type
of analysis as that involved under the factual specificity requirement. This
conclusion follows from the logical progression of steps outlined below.
Step 1: Factual Specificity is a Pleading Requirement Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
The requirement of factual specificity285 in a complaint has a long his-
tory within American jurisprudence, and the standard for what is re-
quired has ebbed and flowed during particular periods.286 The enactment
of the Federal Rules clearly represented a commitment to a more relaxed
standard of factual specificity,287 but the Federal Rules did not com-
pletely eliminate the factual specificity requirement.288 A plaintiff’s com-
plaint must include at least a minimum amount of factual specificity
regarding the events on which the defendant’s liability is premised in or-
der to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.
Step 2: The Pleading Requirement of Factual Specificity Is an Implicit
Requirement for Evidence
A factual specificity requirement is not a measure of the drafting ability
of the plaintiff’s lawyer. Instead, it is an implicit requirement regarding
the evidence a plaintiff must have at the outset of the suit. As Professor
Kaplow has stated:
[I]nsistence on a statement of facts (notably, regarding allegations in
a complaint) does not in itself constitute a demand for evidence. . . .
This conclusion, however, is substantially misleading—that is, as long
as allegations based on pure fantasy are impermissible. Proffering a
fact entails holding some basis for acceptance of the fact as true,
which in turn requires possessing some evidence. . . . Knowledge pre-
supposes some evidentiary basis, information is tantamount to evi-
dence, and belief in the truth of a fact presupposes evidence. As a
consequence, although insistence on particular facts is not per se a
demand for evidence, for all practical purposes it requires
evidence.289
Properly understood, then, the factual specificity requirement is not re-
ally about the skill of the lawyer in drafting the complaint, but rather the
285. A variety of terms other than “factual specificity” has been used to refer to the
requirement that a complaint contain a minimum amount of factual detail regarding the
real world events on which the defendant’s liability is premised. See Meier, supra note 5, at
721–22 (discussing the different words or phrases used to refer to this requirement but
ultimately settling on the “factual specificity” phrase as the best).
286. See id. at 713–20 (discussing the ebb and flow regarding the amount of factual
specificity required of a plaintiff’s complaint).
287. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202, at 93 (3d ed. 1994) (“Federal civil pleadings differ from the ‘fact
pleading’ of the codes principally in the degree of generality with which the elements of the
claim may be stated.”).
288. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (refuting the notion that the
“Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether”); Meier, supra
note 5, at 720–23 (discussing how the case of Conley v. Gibson affirms that some factual
specificity is still required under the Federal Rules).
289. Kaplow, supra note 43, at 1260–61.
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evidence available to that lawyer at the outset of the litigation. A lawyer
who has the right type of evidence will be able to draft her complaint with
sufficient factual specificity. The real problem for a lawyer in meeting the
factual specificity requirement of the Federal Rules is when there is a
dearth of evidence at the time the complaint is being written.
Step 3: A Plaintiff With Direct Evidence Will Satisfy the Factual Specific-
ity Requirement
So, what type of evidence will enable the plaintiff’s lawyer to comply
with the factual specificity requirements of the Federal Rules? As it turns
out, the particular type of evidence a plaintiff has at the outset of a case
will influence the manner in which the complaint is drafted and whether
that complaint can be drafted with factual specificity.
Recall the distinction made earlier in this Article between direct and
circumstantial evidence.290 If a plaintiff has direct evidence (such as a
witness’s account of the events) of the underlying events, she will be able
to draft her complaint with factual specificity. A plaintiff who has a direct
witness to the litigation events will be able to describe those events
(based on the witness’s account) by supplying the “who, what, when,
where” regarding those events. A plaintiff who has this type of evidence
will thus easily satisfy the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8 and
will be allowed to proceed in the litigation (assuming the legal theory of
her case is sound)291 towards a conclusion as to whether that evidence
actually represents the historical facts.
Step 4: A Plaintiff Without Direct Evidence Cannot Draft a Factually
Specific Complaint
Although a plaintiff with direct evidence will have no problem drafting
a factually specific complaint, a plaintiff without direct evidence simply
cannot draft a factually specific complaint. Without a witness to observe
the litigation facts, a plaintiff’s attorney cannot describe these events in
any detail.292
Step 5: A Plaintiff Without Direct Evidence Will Allege Circumstantial
Evidence
When a plaintiff does not have direct evidence and thus cannot de-
scribe the material facts with factual specificity, the plaintiff’s lawyer will
intuitively understand that there must be some basis for making a factual
assertion to which the plaintiff has no witness. In this situation, the plain-
tiff will explain in the complaint the foundation for the plaintiff’s factual
assertion that the relevant event did, in fact, occur. In doing so, the plain-
tiff’s attorney will describe (with specificity) other facts (to which there
are first-hand observers) that supply the basis of the plaintiff’s conclusion
290. See supra Section I.A.
291. See Meier, supra note 5, at 722 (explaining the requirement that the facts alleged
by the plaintiff represent a viable legal theory of recovery).
292. A plaintiff’s attorney could, of course, fabricate specific facts regarding the events
on which the defendant’s liability is premised, but this would run afoul of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (explaining the requirement
that the factual contentions in a complaint have evidentiary support).
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that the material fact did occur. In other words, the plaintiff will plead her
circumstantial evidence.
The Twombly complaint illustrates this phenomenon. In Twombly, the
plaintiffs needed to show the defendants had entered into an actual
agreement or conspiracy.293 The plaintiffs, however, had no witness to
this purported agreement and thus were unable to provide any factual
detail regarding the specifics of this agreement (where it was agreed to,
and when, and by whom, etc.).294 The plaintiffs’ complaint attempted to
justify the factual assertion of an agreement, however, by pleading (with
factual specificity) the parallel business behavior of the defendants.295 In
Twombly, the Court considered how to analyze a complaint that fails the
test for factual specificity and, instead, asserts direct evidence of circum-
stantial facts from which the material fact might be inferred.296
Step 6: A Complaint That Fails the Test for Factual Specificity Must Sat-
isfy the Plausibility Test
In Twombly, then, the Court was presented with a dispute in which the
plaintiffs (as evidenced by the plaintiffs’ complaint) had no direct evi-
dence on a material fact but, rather, only circumstantial evidence.297 The
plausibility standard is the test that the Court used to measure the suffi-
ciency of this complaint. In this sense, then, it is accurate to say that the
plausibility test is triggered by the failure of a complaint to meet the fac-
tual specificity requirements of the Federal Rules. Moreover, because di-
rect evidence always satisfies the factual specificity requirement, it is also
accurate to say that the plausibility test will only be triggered by a com-
plaint in which there is no direct evidence on a material fact.298
Step 7: Plausibility Measures the Link between the Circumstantial Evi-
dence and the Material Fact
The plausibility analysis, then, considers the relationship between the
circumstantial “evidence” pleaded by the plaintiff in her complaint (with
sufficient factual specificity, meaning that the plaintiff has direct evidence
regarding this fact) and the material fact to which there is no direct
evidence.
If plausibility measures the relationship between the circumstantial evi-
dence and the material fact, is this done from the perspective of
probability or confidence? The progression of the analytical steps out-
lined above strongly suggests that plausibility involves a confidence anal-
ysis. After all, the analysis that precipitates the plausibility standard is
293. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546 (citing Sherman Act § 1).
294. Id. at 551 (quoting ¶ 51 of the plaintiffs’ complaint).
295. See id.
296. See id. at 571.
297. See id.
298. This is not to say, however, that that absence of direct evidence will necessarily
trigger the plausibility test. As I have explained at length elsewhere, certain factual matters
are not capable of a factually specific description and thus cannot be subject to the factual
specificity requirement. See Meier, supra note 5, at 755–61 (explaining how the material
fact of the defendant’s state of mind in Iqbal was not a fact that was capable of a specific
factual description and thus should not have triggered the plausibility test).
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itself a type of confidence analysis. The factual specificity requirement is
a test that measures whether the plaintiff has direct evidence at the outset
of the case. This test measures the type of evidence that is present at the
outset of the case, but it has nothing to do with the ultimate truth of that
direct evidence. The factual specificity requirement is about the suffi-
ciency of evidence but not about the ultimate “truth” or probability of
facts. This factual issue is resolved later in the lawsuit. Thus, to the extent
that the factual specificity requirement is a conclusion about the ade-
quacy of the evidence put forward by the plaintiff, but not the ultimate
facts of the litigation, it is a form of a confidence analysis.
Because the factual specificity requirement is a legal analysis regarding
the adequacy of evidence rather than the existence of facts, it is only logi-
cal that the plausibility test, which is triggered by the factual specificity
requirement, would also involve this same type of inquiry. Indeed, it
would be somewhat ironic to ask a judge to do a probability analysis of a
plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence simply because the plaintiff had failed
the factual specificity analysis. This is akin to asking a student who has
failed her Latin exam to retake the exam, but then asking her about
calculus—rather than Latin—on the retake. Regardless of how the stu-
dent does on the calculus retake, we have still not resolved whether she
knows her Latin. A confidence analysis and the probability analysis in-
volve different types of inquiry, and it makes no sense to relax the re-
quirements for the evidence a plaintiff must have at the outset of a case
(a confidence inquiry) simply because a particular trial judge happens to
believe in the ultimate truth of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.299
There is another benefit to interpreting the plausibility test as requiring
a confidence analysis. In addition to aligning the plausibility test with the
factual specificity requirement, a confidence interpretation of plausibility
aligns this pleading requirement with the standard for summary judg-
ment. Numerous commentators have viewed the plausibility requirement
as a pre-discovery application of the standard for summary judgment.300 I
299. Of course, with regard to direct evidence, it is easier to distinguish between a confi-
dence and probability analysis because it is not possible to truly engage in a probability
analysis without hearing the witnesses testify, in open court, and be subjected to cross
examination. This is why, at the pleadings stage, the factual specificity requirement (a con-
fidence inquiry) has never been mistaken as a test that requires the judge to evaluate the
ultimate truth (a probability inquiry) of the plaintiff’s allegations. This type of probability
analysis is simply not possible from written assertions based on direct witness observations.
As explained in Section III(A), however, it is possible to engage in a probability analysis of
circumstantial evidence, at least when the existence of the basic facts is agreed upon by
both parties. In this instance (which is the case when Twombly’s plausibility analysis ap-
plies), a probability analysis depends on an estimation as to the frequency with which the
material facts follow from the basic facts, but it does not depend upon proceedings in open
court. Simply because a probability analysis is possible in the Twombly context (meaning
cases in which the plaintiff has used circumstantial “evidence” in support of material facts
to which the plaintiff has no direct witness), does not mean that this is what plausibility
requires. That a probability analysis is possible in the Twombly context has contributed, I
believe, to the confusion over what is actually required by the test.
300. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 148 (2010) (arguing that both summary judgment and
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agree with this perspective, but the true link between these two legal tests
is the confidence inquiry. As I have written at length elsewhere,301 a
judge applying the modern test for summary judgment will determine
whether the plaintiff has produced an adequate amount of information
such that the judge is justified in sending the case to the jury. The plead-
ing requirement of plausibility requires the judge to apply this same type
of inquiry at the outset of the litigation. It is not an accident that the
plausibility standard was introduced in a type of case (antitrust) in which
the Supreme Court had previously used a confidence inquiry to dispose
of a plaintiff’s claim at summary judgment (Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation302). Under Matsushita, the plaintiff’s cir-
cumstantial evidence was not adequate to permit the plaintiff to proceed
to the jury; in Twombly, the Court simply applied this evidentiary stan-
dard to the information that the plaintiff had at the outset of the case.303
Properly understanding Twombly’s plausibility standard does not mean
that one has to like it; conversely, however, resolving that one does not
like it should only be done after one fully understands the contours of the
analytical inquiry required under the standard. Along these lines, the ob-
jective of this Article has been descriptive rather than normative. The
best reading of Twombly’s plausibility standard is that it requires a judge
to measure the adequacy of the evidence possessed by the plaintiff at the
outset of the case by using a confidence inquiry similar to the one em-
ployed by courts at the summary judgment stage. Recognizing this aspect
of the confidence inquiry does not resolve all of the normative attacks
that have been launched against plausibility. For instance, many of the
critiques of plausibility have denounced the fact that the standard de-
prives the plaintiff of the opportunity to use the broad discovery tools
under the Federal Rules.304 This criticism of the plausibility standard is
on-target and well-founded. After all, the effect of the Court’s disposition
in Twombly deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to use discovery to
modern pleadings doctrine perform a similar gatekeeping function); Lee Goldman,
Trouble for Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
the Oligopoly Problem, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1057, 1089 (2008) (comparing summary judg-
ment standards and pleading standards in antitrust cases); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the
Chaff With Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About
Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1241 (2008) (“Twombly has been
said to be the Matsushita of pleading.”); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atl. v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
61, 62 (2007) (“Twombly [ ] was a disguised motion for summary judgment . . . .”).
301. See generally Meier, supra note 12, at 814–16.
302. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Many
commentators have noted the potential link between Twombly and Matsushita. See Bur-
bank, supra note 117, at 559 (discussing the “striking resemblance” between Twombly and
Matsushita); see also Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An
Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3–10
(2010) (discussing Twombly and Matsushita’s joint use of the term “plausible”). But see
Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with
Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 197 (2011) (“Twombly involved a
somewhat different fact pattern than Matsushita.”).
303. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597–98; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
304. See supra note 32.
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locate direct evidence that might enable the plaintiff to meet the Matsu-
shita summary judgment confidence standard. Whether a pre-trial proce-
dural system should require the plaintiff to come armed to the litigation
with a sufficient amount of evidence to proceed to a jury is admittedly a
difficult normative question. This Article offers no position on that
question.
That said, recognizing that plausibility requires a confidence analysis
does resolve many of the critiques that have been lodged against the stan-
dard. There is a logical basis to the plausibility standard, as it is simply a
logical extension of the factual specificity requirement, which is itself a
form of confidence analysis. The plausibility analysis can be performed at
the pleadings stage. Moreover, plausibility (properly understood as a con-
fidence requirement) does not intrude upon the Seventh Amendment.
Recognizing these aspects of the plausibility analysis will be a good start
towards a better understanding of this pleading requirement, which
should facilitate a discussion of the legitimate normative questions involv-
ing plausibility that this Article does not address.
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